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ABSTRACT
This study examines variables that may be useful in predicting accounting misstatements.
Using a database of Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release information and building on
recent models and methodology, I separate the observations by industry to determine the firm
and financial statement variables that are most useful in predicting the firms within specific
industries that may have accounting misstatements. I also extend the previous models to
determine the significant variables in predicting not only which firms may have misstatements,
but also the account(s) in which a misstatement is likely to have occurred. These models use
information that is readily available in the financial statements, making them useful to auditors,
regulators, and other users of financial statements. Finally, I examined the consistency of the
predictive variables over several time periods.
My findings suggest that several variables that were found to be significant in a
generalized model in previous literature lack significance in more specialized models and that
some variables that were found to have no significance in a generalized model in previous
literature do have significance in more specialized models. Specifically, the variables “soft
assets” and “issue” appear to be the most consistent predictors of misstatements across
industries, accounts, and time.

Keywords: accounting misstatements; fraud prediction; AAER; misstating industries; misstated
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1. INTRODUCTION
Throughout the last two decades, accounting researchers have attempted to develop
methods to predict and detect financial statement misstatements due to error or fraud. Seminal
research on this topic has found that using simple financial ratios can allow interested financial
statement users to predict misstating firms with some accuracy (Beneish, 1999; Bayley and
Taylor, 2007). Further research has found financial variables that are significant in predicting
misstating firms, although the calculation of the variables is more complex (Dechow, Ge,
Larson, and Sloan, 2011). Both approaches to the prediction of misstating firms involve the
creation and use of a scoring system to assign the likelihood that an individual firm may be
misstating its financial statements. In addition, both approaches address the prediction of
misstating firms, but do not extend further to more specialized prediction models that include a
specification of the firms’ industry, nor do they extend further to identify the individual
account(s) that may be misstated.
To date, no research has attempted to create a more accurate measurement of the
likelihood of misstatement beyond an overall assessment at the firm level. There is a lack of
subsequent research designed to provide greater ability to predict misstating firms by drilling
down by industry, and similarly, there is a lack of research which aims to predict which
account(s) may be misstated by firms identified as likely to misstate.
Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, and Neal (2010) find that misstatements are clustered in
certain industries, indicating the importance of considering the industry in which a firm is
operating. Consideration of industry risk and account-level risk is noted specifically in PCAOB
Accounting Standard 2110 (AS 2110). Paragraphs 04 through 09 of AS 2110 note that the
industry in which a firm is operating should be taken into consideration when assessing risk and
that the auditor should obtain an understanding of the firm and the industry and environment in
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which it operates. Specifically, paragraph 05 notes that “risks of material misstatement can arise
from a variety of sources,” including the firm’s industry and environment. Paragraphs 59 through
64 of AS 2110 go into further detail about the auditor’s requirement to assess the risk of material
misstatement, noting in particular the need to assess account- and assertion-level risks. AS 2110
requires that the auditor identify significant accounts and the possible sources of potential
significant misstatements within each identified account.
Since recent scoring models provide a reasonable level of accuracy in predicting
misstatements, it follows that using similar techniques to create scoring models specific to
certain industries and individual accounts can potentially result in models with even greater
power for misstatement prediction. This study attempts to determine the variables significant to
the prediction of misstating firms by industry, and also determine the variables significant to the
prediction of individual misstated accounts, thus filling the gap in the literature while adding to
the information available to investors, creditors, regulators, and auditors.
To identify the variables significant in the prediction of misstating firms within industries
and accounts, I follow the methodology used in Dechow et al. (2011). I first obtain Accounting
and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) data, described fully in Dechow et al. (2011). The
dataset that I work with for this paper expands the data timeframe (1980 to 2002) from that of
Dechow et al. (2011) to include more current evidence on misstatements (1980 to 2008).
Next, I determine the variables that are likely to have predictive value for each of the
selected industries and accounts. Because these variables are based on publicly available
financial statement data, this increases the accessibility to financial statement users. In particular,
this study focuses on predicting the likelihood of misstatement in the most frequently misstated
industries and accounts. In studies performed for the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of
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the Treadway Commission (COSO), Beasley, Carcello, and Hermanson (1999) and Beasley,
Carcello, Hermanson, and Neal (2010) note that during both the period 1987 through 1997 and
the period 1998 through 2007, the industries with the greatest frequency of misstated financial
statements included computer hardware/software, other manufacturing, financial service
industries, healthcare and health products, retailers and wholesalers, and other service providers.
In addition, Beasley et al. (1999) and Beasley et al. (2010) find that the most frequently
misstated accounts for the time periods 1987 through 1997 and 1998 through 2007 remained the
same: revenue, inventory, accounts receivable, property, plant, and equipment, and liabilities and
expenses. 1 In addition, an analysis of the AAER data showed that the computers, durable
manufacturers, services, and retail industries were the top four most frequently misstated
industries during the period 1980 to 2008. All other industries had less than 60 misstated firm
years across the 29-year period studied in this paper. Accordingly, this study focuses on the
industries and accounts that are most likely to involve materially misstated financial statements.
An analysis of the selected industries and accounts will offer the greatest value to those assessing
the information risk within the financial statements. As other industries and accounts are much
less represented as having misstatements in the financial statements, analysis on these remaining
industries and accounts would offer minimal incremental value.
Using logistic regressions based on misstating firms within these selected industries and
logistic regressions based on the most frequently misstated accounts, I determine the variables
that are significant to misstatement prediction within these industries and accounts. Based on a
sample of 1,297 firms that were issued at least one AAER between 1982 and 2012, I find that the
percentage change in soft assets (soft assets are defined as total assets less property, plant, and

1

The COSO report does not break out specific liability or expense accounts.
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equipment and cash) and the issuance of securities during the fiscal year is consistently
significant in the prediction of misstatements within industries and accounts. In addition, I find
that leverage and the existence of operating leases are significant in the prediction of misstating
firms within the computer hardware and software industry, where these variables were not
significant in a generalized model in previous literature. For the retail industry, change in same
store sales, a newly tested variable, is found to be significant. For the service industry, I find no
variables to be significant that were not significant in a generalized model, although some
variables significant in a generalized model were not significant in the service-specific model.
I also find that several variables that were previously found to be useful in a general
misstatement prediction model do not hold their significance when utilized in models of
predicting misstatement by industry. For the computer hardware and software industry, these
variables include rsst accrual, change in inventory, percent change in cash sales, percent change
in return on assets, and abnormal change in employees. 2 For the retail industry, these variables
include rsst accrual, percent change in inventory, percent change in cash sales, percent change in
return on assets, abnormal change in employees, and change in operating leases. For the service
industry, these variables include rsst accrual, percent change in receivables, percent change in
return on assets, abnormal change in employees, and change in operating leases.
With regard to prediction models for misstated accounts, I find that change in inventory,
soft assets, the existence of a lease, and the issuance of securities during the year were significant
predictors of misstatements in all three studied accounts. In addition, I find that the change in
receivables and change in operating leases were predictors of misstatements in the revenue and
accounts receivable accounts, but not for the inventory account.

2
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To test the stability of the models, I use the prediction models over subperiods of the full
sample. Many predictors of misstatements tend to remain consistent across time periods, whether
for all industries and accounts or for industry- and account-specific prediction models.
This paper contributes to the accounting literature by being the first to determine the most
relevant variables in the prediction of financial statement misstatements within specific
industries and accounts. While other research has provided generalized misstatement prediction
methodologies, none have drilled down to create predictions specific to industry or account. By
utilizing industry- or account-specific predictive variables and models, creditors, investors,
regulators, and auditors may be able to predict with greater power and accuracy which firms may
be more likely to have misstated their financial statements and which accounts may be more
likely to have been misstated. This study finds that some variables from a general model may be
useful predictors in most industry- and account-specific misstatement models, while finding that
other variables that were not previously included in or found significant in a general model do
have predictive value in some industry-specific and account-specific models. These differences
from a generalized model from prior literature indicate that greater predictive accuracy is
possible through the use of variables tailored to each industry-specific and account-specific
model.
The remainder of this paper continues as follows: Section 2 reviews prior literature,
Section 3 discusses the motivation and hypotheses, Section 4 describes the data used in this
study, Section 5 delineates the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes the paper and offers
avenues for future research.
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2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Fraud Risk Factors
Identifying factors that can help predict fraud has long been a topic of interest to auditing
standard setters and academic researchers. For example, SAS 82 (AICPA 1997) provided
auditors with examples of fraud risk factors that could be used to help predict fraud. Five years
later, this standard was replaced by SAS 99 (AICPA 2002) which incorporates the fraud triangle
of opportunities, incentives, and attitudes/rationalization. 3 Early research attempted to identify
factors associated with fraud firms. For example, Beasley (1997) found that the proportion of
independent board members is lower for firms that experience financial fraud compared to a
matched sample of non-fraud firms. Farber (2005) and Abbott, Parker, and Peters (2004)
similarly find that fraud firms have poor governance compared to non-fraud firms.
These studies look at corporate governance as one dimension of firms that engage in
fraudulent financial reporting. In contrast, other studies use multivariate prediction models that
attempt to comprehensively investigate the characteristics of firms that engage in financial
reporting fraud.

2.2 Early Misstatement Prediction Models
Academic research has described several approaches to predict misstating or at-risk
firms, beginning with Altman’s Z-score (1968), continuing with Beneish’s M-score (1999) and
more recently, through Dechow et al.’s F-score (2011). Different approaches and data sources
have been used throughout prior literature, but no previous study has broached the realm of
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going beyond the prediction of misstating firms and into the prediction of misstating firms by
industry or accounts that a firm may be misstating.
Altman (1968) wrote a seminal paper in this area, stemming from his observation that
academicians and practitioners find differing analytical methods more useful in the analysis of
financial performance of businesses. Practitioners preferred the use of ratio analysis while
academicians preferred the use of statistical techniques. While his study’s focus was to “bridge
the gap” between statistical analysis and ratio analysis, it is convenient that Altman analyzed the
prediction of business bankruptcy. In this study, Altman used a small, matched sample of firms:
those that had declared bankruptcy and those that had not. Altman combined the use of ratio and
statistical analyses by using multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) to create a model to predict
the likelihood that a firm declares bankruptcy. The use of MDA allowed Altman to analyze
twenty-two financial ratios of interest at the same time to determine the financial ratios that,
together, most accurately predicted whether a firm would declare bankruptcy. He found that
considering the following ratios together resulted in a more accurate prediction model than
considering several ratios independently: 1. Working capital/Total assets; 2. Retained
earnings/Total assets; 3. Earnings before interest and taxes/Total assets; 4. Market value
equity/Book value of total debt; and 5. Sales/Total assets.
The prediction model Altman arrived at considers the predictive value of each of these
five ratios and weights them accordingly, using their coefficient estimates. By multiplying a
firm’s ratios by the corresponding coefficients and adding the results of each product, Altman
arrived at a Z-score: the indicator of the probability of a firm declaring bankruptcy. He
determined the Z-score above which about 95% of firms would declare bankruptcy as well as the
Z-score below which no firm in the sample declared bankruptcy. He referred to the area between
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these two Z-scores as the “zone of ignorance,” or in other words, the prediction of bankruptcy for
firms with a Z-score falling into this area was less certain. Altman also found that his prediction
model could accurately predict the occurrence of bankruptcy up to two years prior to the
declaration, with diminishing accuracy for longer periods. In summary, Altman’s Z-score model
claimed 95% accuracy in the year prior to the bankruptcy and 72% accuracy two years prior to
the bankruptcy. The Z-score model’s accuracy decreases to less than 50% when attempting to
predict bankruptcy three to five years prior to the bankruptcy.
While Altman was not the first to use multiple discriminant analysis in the financial or
business setting, he was instrumental in using MDA to combine two useful methods of analysis
to create a prediction model that is generally accessible to both practitioners and academicians.
Approaches similar to his methodology have been used in subsequent misstatement studies,
notably Beneish (1999) and Dechow et al. (2011), as well as in this dissertation.
Beneish (1999) used indices of eight financial ratios to create a model to predict the
likelihood that a firm manipulated its earnings. Beneish selected 49 firms identified by AAERs
as earnings manipulators and an additional 25 firms identified by media outlets as earnings
manipulators, for a total of 74 firms that had manipulated their earnings at some point between
the years of 1982 and 1992. The manipulators were compared to 2,332 non-manipulator firms
matched with the manipulator firms based on industry and year. For each firm, he calculated the
following eight financial statement ratio indices by comparing year t to year t-1: 1. Days sales in
receivables; 2. Gross margin; 3. Asset quality; 4. Sales growth; 5. Depreciation; 6. Sales, general,
and administrative expenses; 7. Leverage; and 8. Total accruals to total assets. Using an
unweighted probit estimate to determine the significance of these indices, he found that days
sales in receivables, gross margin, asset quality, sales growth, and total accruals to total assets
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offered usefulness in the prediction of an earnings manipulation firm. Even though three of the
eight tested variables were found to lack significance, Beneish included all of the variables in his
prediction model. Like Altman (1968), Beneish added the products of the coefficient estimates
and the corresponding ratios for each firm to arrive at the M-score. This resulted in about 50%
accuracy in the prediction of earnings manipulation firms. Beneish found no major difference in
the model’s predictive accuracy resulting from the removal of the non-significant variables and
adjusting the coefficient estimates.
The five significant variables found in Altman (1968) and the five significant variables
found in Beneish (1999) have some similarities. Components of several of the variables include
sales, total assets, current assets, current liabilities, and certain components of equity.
To determine the usefulness of ratio analysis as a method for identifying misstatements,
Kaminski, Wetzel, and Guan (2004) tested twenty-one simple ratios, similar to those used in an
auditor’s analytical procedures, that can be derived directly from financial statements. The study
selected 79 misstating firms as identified in AAERs issued between 1982 and 1999 (fiscal years
analyzed spanned from 1975 to 1999) and matched the firms to similar, non-misstating firms. A
longitudinal study of these twenty-one ratios was conducted, spanning three years prior to and
three years subsequent to the fraud year. In univariate and multivariate analyses, sixteen of the
twenty-one ratios were statistically significant for at least one of the seven years studied.
However, only three of the ratios were significant for three consecutive years: fixed assets to
total assets, total liabilities to total assets, and working capital to total assets. No ratios were
consistently significant throughout the sample period.
Kaminski and Wetzel (2004) conducted a longitudinal examination of ten financial ratios
on 30 matched-pair firms using chaos theory. None of the ratios exhibited stable behavior and
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they did not find any difference among the dynamics of these ratios for fraudulent and
nonfraudulent firms.
A prediction model based on the significant ratios in Kaminski et al. (2004) resulted in
misclassification of fraud firms between 58 and 98 percent of the time. Because of these results,
the authors conclude that ratio analysis is not a reliable method of fraud firm identification. This
study may have been impacted by a changing economic environment, as the study required a
seven-year span for each misstating firm. The study stretched into the late 1990s, a time in which
several major financial statement frauds were just starting to come to light. The effect of these
frauds may have skewed the results of the ratio analysis in some fashion. Despite the conclusion
by the authors, when used in conjunction with more complex ratios and/or accrual analysis, ratio
analysis does appear to have some useful predictive validity (Altman 1968, Beneish 1999,
Bayley and Taylor 2007, Dechow et al. 2011).
Bayley and Taylor (2007) note the same disconnect between practice and academia that
Altman (1968) did, noting further that most earnings management literature subsequent to Jones
(1991) follows the Jones or Modified Jones models, making incremental changes to the model in
an attempt to find a more precise model of identifying overstated earnings. Bayley and Taylor
believe that too much focus has been placed on avoiding Type I errors where the avoidance of
Type II errors should be the greater focus. In normative terms, it is better to predict that a nonmisstating firm has misstated their financial statements than to predict that a misstating firm has
not misstated their financial statements.
Bayley and Taylor (2007) contend and find that using a simpler measure of accruals in
conjunction with simple ratio analysis will have more power in identifying earnings
manipulation than prior iterations of the Jones model. Using a sample of 129 earnings
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manipulators identified by AAERs as having manipulated their earnings between 1991 and 2003,
the study matched each of these firms with five non-manipulators (the control group) and used
logit analysis to determine the significant variables among six ratio indices. Bayley and Taylor
use the same methodology as Altman (1968) and Beneish (1999) by multiplying the coefficient
estimates by the corresponding accruals and ratios for each firm to arrive at an EM-score.
Univariate logistic regressions found that the operating accrual magnitude, sales index,
accruals index, and inventory index were significant in the identification of earnings
manipulation. The sales index is a measure of the reported net revenue compared to an estimate
of unmanipulated net revenue. Unmanipulated net revenue is calculated using the change in the
accounts receivable to net revenue ratio over time. The accruals index is a measure of earnings
manipulation and is calculated using the current value of deflated operating accruals, lagged total
assets, and the lagged current value of deflated operating accruals. The inventory index is a
measure of earnings manipulation using inventory accounting techniques. This index is
calculated using the current inventory to net revenue ratio and the lagged inventory to lagged net
revenue ratio.
Multivariate logistic regressions found that operating accrual magnitude and the sales
index were the only significant variables in earnings manipulation identification. Operating
accrual magnitude is calculated as the sum of earnings before extraordinary items and
depreciation and amortization expense, less cash flow from operations, scaled by total assets.
The sales index is calculated by dividing net revenue by the estimate of non-manipulated net
revenue. Bayley and Taylor (2007) compared the power of their EM-score model to the power of
four other models based on the Jones model used in prior research (Dechow and Sweeney, 1995;
Dechow et al., 2003), and found that the EM-score model has more power than the other four
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models, with about 65% classification accuracy. As a result, the authors recommended that
future research in this field focus more on models that combine simple accrual calculations with
other financial statement ratios while putting less focus on discretionary accrual models.

2.3 Non-Financial Measures in Fraud Prediction
The usefulness of non-financial measures as predictors of revenue fraud was studied by
Brazel et al. (2009). The authors hypothesized that the difference between the year-over-year
change in any non-financial measure and year over year change in revenue would be larger for
fraud firms than for non-fraud firms. It was expected that the firms committing financial
statement fraud would manipulate the financial data, but not the non-financial data that is made
public, not always in the financial statements, but in other data sources. Non-financial data was
hand-collected through searches of 10Ks, Proquest, Lexis/Nexis, Google, and other available
resources. The authors identified their fraud sample using the AAERs in the Beasley et al. (1999)
COSO report from 1987 to 1997, by conducting their own search of AAERs from 1998 to 2007,
and by searching media sources for additional fraud cases. The final fraud sample consisted of 50
fraud firms, with fraud years ranging from 1994 to 2002. The fraud firms were each matched
with one of their closest non-fraud competitors. Brazel et al. (2009) created a generalized
variable to measure the difference between revenue growth (or reduction) and the growth (or
reduction) of any non-financial measure (NFM):
Capacity Difft = (Revenuet – Revenuet-1) – (NFMt – NFMt-1)
Revenuet-1
NFMt-1
As an example, the study used employee growth as a single non-financial measure:
Employee Difft = (Revenuet – Revenuet-1) – (Employeest – Employeest-1)
Revenuet-1
Employeest-1
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Using 18 control variables selected based on their use in prior literature (including
leverage, Altman Z-score, and total accruals), the study calculated the difference between the
means of each control variable as well as Capacity Diff and Employee Diff (Capacity Diff is
calculated as the average of all of the non-financial measures that were available for each
matched pair). In addition to a few control variables, the study found that both Capacity Diff and
Employee Diff were significantly larger for the fraud firms than for the matched non-fraud firms,
indicating that the Capacity Diff and Employee Diff both have discriminatory power in the
detection of financial statement fraud. Finally, a logistic regression was run with Employee Diff
as the independent variable of interest. Again, in addition to a few control variables, Employee
Diff was significant to the detection of financial statement fraud.
The results of the Brazel et al. (2009) study indicate that similar to some financial
measures and ratios, non-financial measures can be useful in the detection of financial statement
fraud. This study was also able to establish benchmarks that can be used by those analyzing a
firm’s non-financial measures, which were generalized and not industry-specific, to determine
the likelihood of financial statement fraud. The authors recognize that some of the firms
committing financial statement fraud may in fact also fraudulently adjust the applicable nonfinancial measures, especially as time goes on, as the methods of fraud have a tendency to
change over time. On a related note, many of the available non-financial data are firm-provided
and not independently confirmed, which may have a negative effect on the reliability and
usefulness of the non-financial measures. Finally, the authors question whether there may be a
lead or a lag in the data, meaning that for example, a decrease in the number of employees may
occur at the same time, before, or after revenue decreases. The introduction of non-financial
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measures into a misstatement prediction model introduces a slew of topics for future research,
and more so as the non-financial data becomes more readily available.
Cohen et al. (2012) studied the availability of several non-financial measures gathered via
corporate reporting of this data. Using a sample of ten firms in each of five industries, Cohen
searched available data sources, including mandatory filings, websites, fact sheets, press releases,
etc., for firm-provided information on six leading indicators of long-term value (future cash
flows). In particular, Cohen et al. (2012) searched for information regarding market share,
quality rankings, customer satisfaction, employee satisfaction, employee turnover, and
innovation. The research found that there is great variability of reporting of these non-financial
measures. Some firms may provide a significant amount of non-financial information while
others provide very little. Whether a firm discloses certain non-financial information is also
dependent on the size of the firm and the industry in which it operates.
The study found that of the six measures studied, the most frequently disclosed measures
were market share and innovation, and the most frequently used non-financial disclosure sources
were corporate websites and mandatory filings. This study highlights a potential selection bias:
firms may choose to voluntarily disclose positive non-financial information while opting not to
disclose negative non-financial information. In addition, the non-financial data provided by firms
can be withdrawn from sources like corporate websites at any time. As a result, the authors note
that a net benefit may result from the institution of mandatory disclosure and/or assurance by
independent external auditors. The study included a sample size of 50 firms, and the results of
this study indicate that finding reliable information reported on a consistent basis is unlikely. At
this point in time, most non-financial information would need to be hand-collected, which is
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prohibitive, and the accuracy of the information found may not be reliable, as similarly noted by
Brazel et al. (2009).

2.4 Recent Misstatement Prediction Models
Brazel et al. (2015) surveyed 194 nonprofessional investors who had traded individual
stocks within the previous 12 months to determine relationships between investor perception of
the prevalence of financial statement fraud, investor use of financial statement information,
investors’ conducting of their own fraud risk assessments, and investor use of red flags that could
indicate fraud. The study found that the investors who use financial statement information and
believe that financial statement fraud is prevalent also find it important to conduct their own
fraud risk assessments. In addition, the study found that of those investors who conduct their
own fraud risk assessments, they consider SEC investigations, pending litigation, violations of
debt covenants, and management turnover as useful indicators of financial statement fraud. Three
of the four noted red flags are non-financial measures, indicating that moderately sophisticated
users of financial statements tend to find non-financial measures to be useful indicators of the
risk of fraud, and make investing decisions based on their risk assessment. Brazel et al. (2015)
also noted that some financial and non-financial measures were not considered important in the
risk assessment decisions by the surveyed investors. Those measures include company size and
age, need for external financing, and auditor quality (Big 4 vs non-Big 4 auditor).
Dechow et al. (2011) agree with the recommendation made by Bayley and Taylor (2007)
to move toward models that combine a simple accrual calculation with other financial statement
ratios, and created a model that includes the modified Jones model of discretionary accruals and
performance-matched discretionary accruals, as well as working capital accruals. They also use a
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measure of accruals similar to working capital accrual, but included changes in long-term
operating assets and long-term operating liabilities, as well as numerous financial and nonfinancial measures. Ultimately, Dechow et al. (2011) found that of the accruals variables tested,
only the working capital accruals modified to include changes in long-term operating assets and
long-term operating liabilities was significant in the prediction of misstating firms.
Dechow et al. (2011) reviewed all of the available AAERs (at that time) for companies
cited for violating GAAP and created another scoring model for assessing the likelihood that any
particular public company may be materially misstating its financial statements. The Dechow et
al. (2011) prediction model (hereafter referred to as the Dechow model) uses information
available in financial statements and from other sources (i.e., company websites for the number
of employees and other nonfinancial measures, although it appears that the data for the Dechow
model variables was obtained from COMPUSTAT and CRSP) in order to calculate specific
variables used in the prediction model.
Using AAERs from 1982 to 2005, Dechow et al. (2011) collected information about
firms that were found by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to have intentionally
manipulated their annual financial statements. After determining the misstating firms based on
AAER issuance, the Dechow et al. (2011) study analyzed several financial variables and ratios
that were calculated using information taken from the financial statements, including two nonfinancial measures. The variables analyzed were broken down into the following categories
(number of variables): accrual quality (9), performance (5), nonfinancial measures (2), offbalance-sheet information (4), and market-related incentives (8). The non-financial measures
included were abnormal change in employees and abnormal change in order backlog. I note the
abnormal change in employees variable in particular because the Dechow et al. (2011) study
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calculates this variable differently than Brazel et al. (2009). Dechow et al. (2011) calculates this
variable as:
ch_emp = (Employeest – Employeest-1) – (Total Assetst – Total Assetst-1)
Employeest-1
Total Assetst-1
No explanation was offered for their use of total assets, rather than the total revenue
measure used in the Brazel et al. (2009) calculation. While the study did find the abnormal
change in employees to be statistically significant, it is unclear if this variable’s significance
would increase or decrease if total revenues was used. Brazel et al. (2009) indicate that the
number of employees is a measure of capacity for production of earnings, with the understanding
that as capacity for production of earnings decreases, earnings (revenue) should decrease as well,
and to a similar extent. The Dechow et al. (2011) calculation of this variable, using total assets
instead of revenue, does not necessarily offer the same expected correlation. In addition to the
number of employees, total assets is also a measure of capacity (as the number of production
facilities decreases, so does the capacity for production of earnings, for example). The two
measures both measure capacity for production for earnings, as opposed to measuring the
capacity for production of earnings against actual reported earnings.
By running a series of logistic regressions on the variables, Dechow et al. (2011) found
that 11 of the 28 tested variables were significant in the prediction of misstating firms; four in the
accrual quality category; two in the performance category; one in the non-financial measures
category; one in the off-balance-sheet category; and three in the market-related incentives
category. The significance of these variables within their categories speaks to the opportunity
and motivation involved when intentionally manipulating the financial statements; because
accruals are subjective, they offer a greater opportunity to engage in earnings management, and
meeting performance goals and a firm’s participation in accessing the debt market provides the
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incentive behind earnings management. The significant variables are indicators providing insight
into the likelihood that a firm has manipulated their financial statements. This finding
corroborates the concept of the fraud triangle: that fraud is more likely to occur when there are
pressures/motivation, opportunity, and rationalization present (Bell and Carcello, 2000; Rezaee,
2005; Hogan et al., 2008; Trompeter et al., 2013).
After determining the significant variables, the Dechow et al. (2011) study moved on to
the second stage of their paper by developing a prediction model that assigns each significant
variable (as determined in the first stage of their paper) a relative weight or value in predicting
misstated financial statements. Combining those weights and the variable values for each firmyear, the model assigns each firm-year an F-score, indicating the probability that the financial
statements associated with any particular firm-year are misstated.
The Dechow model uses an F-score of 1.4 as an indicator: over half of the misstated
firms (as indicated by the AAERs) had an F-score of 1.4 or greater. The study also found that the
F-scores for misstating firms increased in the years leading up to the misstated firm-year and
decline after the misstatement firm-year.
The Dechow model appears to be reasonably accurate in predicting fraud firms (with
accuracy of up to 69%), even taking into account the self-selection limitations imposed by the
AAER issuance decisions made by the SEC (Aghghaleh, Mohamed, and Rahmat, 2016). How
the SEC selects a firm to investigate for misstated financial statements is not public knowledge,
although the investigation process may be initiated by firm-initiated restatements, media
accusations or concerns about misstatements, or reports by whistleblowers. Because the SEC
cannot and does not investigate and cite all firms that have manipulated their financial
statements, there are an unknown number of firm years that are materially misstated but not
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reported as such through the issuance of an AAER. These firms and firm-years are included with
the non-misstating firms in the data, instead of with the misstating firms, thus skewing the data to
an unknown degree. A firm-year with an F-score below 1.4 may have actually manipulated the
financial statements, but without being cited for such through an AAER, this firm would be
included with the non-misstating firms. It is impossible to determine which firms fall into this
problem area. Even though reliance on the SEC’s investigations and AAERs can result in some
errors in the data, AAERs are still considered to be a reasonable source for research data, as
evidenced by their use by Beneish (1999), Brazel et al. (2009), Dechow et al. (2011), and many
other researchers.

2.5 Prevalence of Misstatements
The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO)
commissioned a study of fraudulent financial statement occurrences, as cited by the SEC through
AAERs. In the study titled “Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987 – 1997; An Analysis of U.S.
Public Companies,” Beasley et al. (1999) reviewed AAERs issued between January 1, 1987 and
December 31, 1997, finding nearly 300 companies that were cited for the violation of Rule
10(b)-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act or Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act during
that time frame. These two rules/sections were selected because they are the primary anti-fraud
provisions related to financial statement reporting. Of these 300 firms, the authors randomly
selected a sample of 204 firms to study further. The study examined specific characteristics
pertaining to the company and to the management of the firms in the sample, finding trends and
similarities (and in some instances, no trends or similarities) among the misstating firms. The
findings of this study included details about the nature of the misstating firms, the nature of the
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control environments, the nature of the frauds, issues related to the external auditor, and
consequences for the companies and individuals involved in the frauds.
Many of the characteristics noted by the Beasley et al. (1999) study could be of interest to
researchers attempting to predict or detect fraud, but there are a few characteristics that are
particularly interesting with respect to this study. First is the finding that some misstating
companies were experiencing losses or were near break-even prior to the fraud. This indicates
that a company’s financial distress may be a precursor to a misstatement, supporting the use of
the Altman Z-score as a predictor of misstatements. Second, Beasley et al. (1999) found that
misstatements were most prevalent in the computer hardware and software, “other”
manufacturing, and financial service industries, with these industries making up 35% of the
financial statement frauds in the sample. Healthcare and health products, retailers and
wholesalers, and “other” service providers comprised an additional 23% of the fraud companies
in the sample. This may indicate that firms in these industries may be the most likely to misstate
their financial statements, or it may indicate that the SEC focused their attention on these
industries more than on others during the period 1987-1997. A limitation of this and other studies
using AAERs as a data source is that this is an unknown: whether more fraud is perpetrated in
any particular industry or whether the SEC places more of a focus on any particular industry.
Third, the Beasley et al. (1999) study found that the misstatement of assets was the most frequent
misstatement type within the sample, with revenue and net income misstatements following
close behind.
The average misstatement of assets was nearly $40 million while the average
misstatement of revenue and net income was nearly $10 million and about $16 million,
respectively. Beasley et al. (1999) found that the asset accounts that were most frequently
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misstated were inventory, accounts receivable, and property, plant, and equipment. Fourth and
finally, it is interesting to note the methods in which assets and revenue were frequently
misstated. To overstate assets, the companies in the sample recorded fictitious assets or assets not
actually owned by the company or capitalized items that should have been expensed. To
overstate revenues, the companies in the sample recorded fictitious revenues or recorded revenue
prematurely. Additional methods of misstatement were not available to the authors. Data
detailing fraud methods or techniques may be useful in future research.
Following some very high-profile and very costly financial statement frauds that came to
light immediately after the release of the initial COSO-sponsored report, COSO commissioned a
second study of fraudulent financial statement occurrences, covering AAERs issued between
January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2007. In this study, Beasley et al. (2010) updated the findings
from the previous study and noted the differences and similarities between the two time periods.
The authors noted that several large company and large dollar frauds occurred in 2001
and 2002 (including Enron and WorldCom), which caused a drastic departure from the mean
fraud size from the previous study. In this updated study, the review of AAERs found 347
companies that were cited for the violation of Rule 10(b)-5 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act
or Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act during that time frame. Instead of taking a sample of
these alleged fraud firms as was done in the prior study, the authors obtained detailed
information regarding each of these 347 firms and their associated frauds, examining the same as
well as additional characteristics pertaining to the company and management that were studied
previously. The findings of this study included details about the occurrences of financial
statement fraud, management’s tone at the top, the nature of the frauds, the role of the board of
directors, related party transactions, auditor considerations, and consequences for individuals and
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firms engaged in fraud. Beasley et al. (2010) places a greater emphasis on corporate governance
than was addressed in Beasley et al. (1999).
The findings in Beasley et al. (2010) are extensive, covering a multitude of topics that are
interesting to fraud researchers, although a few items from the study are of particular interest to
this study. First, the authors noted several motivating factors that were discussed by the SEC in
the AAERs. Some of the most commonly cited reasons for committing financial statement fraud
include meeting analyst expectations, meeting internal targets, concealing the company’s
deteriorating financial position, and meeting targets for management bonus payouts. Not all
AAERs discussed the motivation behind the frauds, so the authors did not tally the frequency of
each motivation. Some of these motivations could be studied empirically in the future, if the
required data becomes available (e.g., meeting internal targets). Second, Beasley et al. (2010)
found that, consistent with the previous study, misstatements were most prevalent in the
computer hardware and software, “other” manufacturing, and healthcare and health products
industries, with these industries making up 51% of the financial statement frauds in this new time
period. Retailers and wholesalers, “other” service providers, and telecommunications comprised
an additional 23% of the fraud companies. Third, the Beasley et al. (2010) study found that
improper revenue recognition overtook the overstatement of assets as the most frequent
misstatement type within the time period.
The mean misstatement of revenue was $455 million, up from a mere $10 million in the
previous study. The mean misstatement of assets was $227 million, up from just $40 million in
the earlier time period, indicating the potential importance of analyzing AAERs separately for
the two time periods. These significant fluctuations are due mainly to the much larger size of the
firms cited for financial statement fraud in the most recently studied time period. Beasley et al.
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(2010) found that the asset accounts that were most frequently misstated continued to be
inventory, accounts receivable, and property, plant, and equipment.
Fourth and finally, it is interesting to note the methods frequently used to misstate
revenue and assets. To overstate revenues, the companies recorded fictitious revenues or
recorded revenue prematurely. In the updated COSO report, Beasley et al. (2010) outlined the
specific techniques used to overstate revenue, including sham sales, conditional sales, bill and
hold transactions, improper cutoff of sales, and unauthorized shipments, among others. To
overstate assets, the companies in this later time period continued the trend of recording fictitious
assets or assets not actually owned by the company or capitalizing items that should have been
expensed. No additional detail or techniques regarding the misstatement of assets were provided.
The Beasley et al. (1999) and Beasley et al. (2010) studies indicate that the most
frequently misstated account is revenue, followed by assets, particularly inventory, accounts
receivable, and property, plant, and equipment. In response to concerns that firms accelerated
revenue to meet earnings targets, the SEC issued Staff Accounting Bulletin 101 (SAB 101) in
1999. Altamuro, Beatty, and Weber (2005) find that firms affected by SAB 101 used revenue to
manage earnings in the period prior to adoption of SAB 101. Callen, Robb, and Segal (2008)
find that firms that have losses are valued based on the level and growth of revenue, and are
more likely to manipulate revenue in violation of GAAP. Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) find
that firms issuing equity manage revenue upward. Bonner, Palmrose, and Young (1998) find that
auditors are more likely to be sued in cases on enforcement actions involving fictitious revenue
or premature revenue recognition.
The frequency with which the revenue account is used to perpetrate fraud/misstatements
is so significant that SAS 99 (now AU-C 240) requires that auditors presume the existence of a
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fraud risk related to improper revenue recognition. While auditors may consider fraud risk in
other accounts, revenue is the only account in which auditors are required to specifically
consider the risk of fraudulent reporting. The characteristics noted by Beasley et al. (1999) and
Beasley et al. (2010) may be developed into variables useful in the prediction of financial
statement fraud (financial distress) or to further focus the attention of research (fraud industries,
fraud accounts, and fraud methods).
The focus of this paper is to rely on financial and non-financial data that is readily
available and to determine any significant trends or associations in the data that are useful in the
prediction of misstating firms by incorporating industry, and useful in the prediction of misstated
accounts.
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3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
3.1 Prediction Models by Industry
Both the Beneish (1999) and Dechow et al. (2011) models were somewhat successful in
identifying misstatement firms. Building upon these models, it is possible to use methodology
similar to that used by Dechow et al. (2011) to extend the model to specific industries. This is
important because the Beasley et al. (1999) and Beasley et al. (2010) studies indicate that
fraudulent financial reporting is more likely to occur in certain industries: computer hardware
and software, “other” manufacturing, financial service, healthcare and health products, retailers
and wholesalers, “other” service providers, and telecommunications. These findings were
corroborated in the Dechow et al. (2011) analysis indicating that the computer, durable
manufacturing, retail, and services industries were the most frequently cited for misstatements in
AAERs. Dechow et al. (2011) also noted that three industries in particular were overrepresented, as compared to the percentage of industry makeup in the COMPUSTAT database.
In order of over-representation, those industries are computer hardware and software, retail, and
services. As such, I selected these three industries to analyze in order to determine the variables
most significant in predicting financial statement misstatements, based on industry.
The industry in which a firm operates has been found to be an important factor not just in
the frequency of misstatements, but also in the likelihood of litigation, whether against the firm
or the auditor, following a misstatement (Bonner et al., 1998; Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper,
1994). Palmrose (1988) found that auditor litigation following a client misstatement occurs most
frequently within the technology and financial services industries.
I expect that the industry distinction as developed in this research may result in finding
some variables that have more predictive power for one industry than for another. In fact, it may
be possible that a variable with no significant predictive power in one industry will have highly
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significant predictive power in another industry. This potential difference may be due to
industry-specific characteristics. For instance, a variable that incorporates inventory may prove
to be significant in the prediction of fraud for the retail industry, but may not be significant at all
in the prediction of fraud for the service industry. By including or omitting certain variables from
the prediction models, the prediction models restricted by industry may provide greater
predictive ability than a more generalized model. The variable restrictions based on industry will
allow the assessment of the effectiveness of the models in providing more accurate withinindustry predictions, which motivates the first hypothesis:
H1: Prediction models individualized by industry will result in greater ability to
predict misstating firms.

3.2 Prediction Models by Account
Similar to the extension of industry-specific models, the previous prediction models can
be extended to go beyond prediction of misstated firms to predict misstated accounts. Prior
literature has shown that the most frequently misstated accounts have consistently been revenue,
inventory, and accounts receivable (Beasley et al., 1999, Beasley et al., 2010). As such, I
selected these three accounts to analyze in order to determine the variables most significant in
predicting misstated accounts. In addition, AU-C 240 requires auditors to presume a fraud risk
related to revenue (AICPA 2002). And finally, consistent with Beasley et al. (1999) and Beasley
et al. (2010), Bonner et al. (1998) found that of the firms that were issued an AAER by the SEC,
the misstated accounts that most frequently resulted in litigation were revenue and assets,
although the individual misstated asset accounts that often led to litigation were not specified.
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Based on the differing characteristics of each account, I expect that some variables will
be significant in the prediction of fraud in one account while those same variables will have no
significance in the prediction of fraud in other accounts. I expect that since the revenue and
accounts receivable accounts are closely related, these two accounts may have similar findings:
both accounts may include and exclude the same variables from the final prediction models. On
the other hand, I expect that variables that incorporate inventory will be significant in the
prediction of the inventory account being misstated, but perhaps not significant, or at least not to
the same degree, for other misstated accounts. This motivates the second research hypothesis:
H2: Prediction models developed at the account level will help predict misstated
accounts.

3.3 Consistency of Predictive Variables
The Dechow et al. (2011) and Beneish (1999) models were developed using
different variables and over different time periods. Very little is known about the stability
of these models over time. Beasley et al. (1999) and Beasley et al. (2010) found similar
trends across two different time periods. The same industries continued to be some of the
most frequently cited for fraudulent financial statements and the same accounts continued
to be some of the most frequently misstated. However, Kaminksi et al. (2004) did not
find any ratios that were consistent predictors of fraud. These longitudinal results
motivate the third research hypothesis:
H3: Predictive variables, whether specific to industry or account, will remain the
same over time.
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Based on the Beasley et al. (1999) and Beasley et al. (2010) findings of similar
misstatement-firm characteristics over time, I expect that the methodology for predicting
misstated financial statements will remain stable across a longitudinal study of predictive
variables. For example, I expect that if soft assets is a significant predictive variable in one time
period, it will continue to be a significant predictive variable across most or all other studied time
periods.
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4. SAMPLE SELECTION
4.1 Data Source
Using data collected by Dechow (see full description of initial sample in Dechow et al.,
2011), I use AAERs issued by the SEC to indicate firms that the SEC cited for financial
statement misstatements. The AAERs document both intentional and unintentional GAAP
violations by a public company and serve as the best proxy for misstatements. The instances of
intentional deceit often result in the SEC’s citation of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933
or Rule 10(b)-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, provisions enacted to specifically
prohibit the inclusion or omission of information to fraudulently promote the purchase of a
firm’s stock by investors. Other potential data sources are available, including firms being sued
by shareholders, firms with Sarbanes-Oxley Act internal control violations, and firms that have
restated their financial statements. All of these data sources, including AAERs, are subject to the
problem of selection bias. When it comes to selection bias in AAERs, I assume that the chance
for Type I error (marking a non-misstating firm as a misstater) is very low, as the firms have
been thoroughly investigated by the SEC. This is an advantage over a database of firms that have
endured litigation initiated by the stockholders. For example, admission of guilt is rarely issued
by accused firms, so it is difficult to assess which of these firms were misstating versus nonmisstating. I conclude that the use of AAERs is advantageous over other available data sources,
as has been done in previous research (Dechow et al., 2011; Beneish 1999; Kaminski 2004;
Bayley and Taylor 2007; Brazel et al., 2009; Beasley et al., 1999; Beasley et al., 2010).

4.2 Timing of Misstatements
I start with the AAER data previously collected as described in Dechow et al. (2011). The
AAER dataset includes all AAERs from the first AAER (AAER 1, released on May 17, 1982)
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through AAER 2261 (released on June 10, 2005). My initial sample was selected from this initial
data. I created an expanded sample selected from additional AAER data collected by Dechow.
This additional data includes AAER 2262 through AAER 3403 (released on August 31, 2012).
The data is comprehensive, listing the cited firms, quarters and years of misstatement,
misstatement accounts, etc.
Although I am unable to precisely reconcile the AAERs and firm-years that Dechow et
al. (2011) used, the differences are minor. To provide more up-to-date analyses, I expand the
time frame and consequently the number of AAERs that are included in the sample. A recent
version of the Dechow data includes records through AAER 3403, which are releases dating
through August 31, 2012. In this paper I run dual analyses: the first including only the AAERs
included in the Dechow et al. (2011) study, and the second including the available AAER
records through August 31, 2012. A second longitudinal study is also run, diving the
misstatement-years into three decade-based time periods. These longitudinal analyses serve to
provide evidence regarding the consistency of the model across time periods. In other words, the
dual analyses show the consistency of the models across time periods to provide evidence on
whether the characteristics of misstating firms have changed over time, and whether a prediction
model can remain static over time or should be fluid, changing over time as the characteristics of
misstating firms change.
Table 1 Panel A shows that there are 2,261 AAERs in the initial data set, however 74
AAERs are missing. An AAER may be missing for any number of reasons. Per Dechow et al.
(2011), many of these AAERs were missing (19), intentionally omitted (11), did not involve
specific company names (41), or were missing from the data set without a specified reason (3).
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The expanded data set includes an additional 1,142 AAERs, of which 75 are missing for
unspecified reasons, for a total of 3,254 AAERs in the expanded data set.
Panel B of Table 1 shows the distribution of AAERs by year. There were a large number
of AAERs issued during years 2000-2004 and 2006-2009. These time frames coincide with the
financial statement misstatements resulting in Sarbanes-Oxley regulations and the 2008 financial
crisis, respectively. The number of AAERs for 2012 is significantly less than recent years
because 2012 includes data for a partial year.
Table 1 Panel C shows that each firm may have more than one AAER, and conversely,
each AAER may refer to more than one firm. For the initial and expanded samples, 41% and
43% of firms were issued just one AAER, respectively. One firm, Enron, was issued 24 AAERs
by the cutoff date of the initial sample and 46 AAERs by the cutoff date of the expanded sample.
Table 1 Panel C indicates 896 and 1,297 firms were cited by the SEC based on the 2,187 and
3,254 AAERs, by respective sample.
Table 2, Panels A and B show the number of misstating firms in each year for both the
initial sample and the expanded sample, respectively. Panel A shows that the highest
concentration of misstating firms centered around 1999 and 2000, the time-period immediately
preceding the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation. Panel B shows that the highest concentration of
misstating firms continues to be centered around 1999 and 2000, extending into 2001 and 2002
as well. In addition, the total number of misstating firms for 1999-2002 (as well as other years, to
a lesser extent) increased with the expanded sample; adding in AAERs from 2005-2012 added a
total of 633 misstating firms to the expanded sample compared to the initial sample. Since
AAERs are issued after (sometimes years after) a misstatement occurs, this significant expansion
of the initial sample is expected.
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5. RESEARCH DESIGN AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1 Variables Analyzed
Closely following the Dechow model, I analyzed variables relating to accruals, financial
performance, non-financial measures, and off-balance sheet information. Prior literature has
shown that simple accrual calculations can have value in the prediction of misstatements. As a
result, I include numerous variables calculated to measure the quality of accruals as well as
changes in certain financial measures that can be manipulated through estimates (receivables,
inventory, and soft assets, for example). Performance variables are used to determine if a firm
may be motivated to misstate the financial statements because of worsening performance by
manipulating other information in the financial statements (a leading indicator), or if these
variables may themselves be manipulated as a way to hide worsening performance (a lagging
indicator).
Non-financial measures are emerging as a new avenue to explore with regard to their
predictive ability. A misstating firm may focus on manipulating the financial data to hide poor
performance, but making corresponding manipulations of non-financial measures may be
overlooked. For example, a firm may manipulate revenue, showing a large increase over the
prior year, but fail to also manipulate the reported number of employees during the year, a nonfinancial measure that often corresponds to a firm’s revenue. Finally, operating leases are often
used by misstating firms to finance purchases of property, plant and equipment without showing
a debt directly on the balance sheet. Therefore, the simple use of operating leases, or perhaps
more importantly, the increased use of operating leases may be indicators of misstated financial
statements. Appendix A offers a description of how each variable is calculated. All variables
previously used in Dechow et al. (2011) are calculated in this paper using the same methods as in
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Dechow et al. (2011). The data used in the calculation of each variable was obtained from
COMPUSTAT.

5.2 New Variables Analyzed
As previously noted, the Dechow model and the Brazel model vary in their calculation of
abnormal change in employees. This study tests each measure of the abnormal change in the
number of employees to determine whether each is useful in the prediction of fraud, and which
provides more predictive usefulness. The EMP DIFF variable used in Brazel et al. (2009) is
calculated in this paper using the same method as in Brazel et al. (2009). See Appendix A for the
calculation method for this and all variables.
For all industries, receivables as a percentage of total sales (rect_sales) is examined as a
potentially significant variable in the prediction of fraud firms. Sales on account are more easily
manipulated than cash sales, so I expect that as this ratio increases and/or increases as compared
to other firms within the same industry, the likelihood of fraud will also increase. As total sales
change year to year, we would expect the percent of those sales that are made on account to
remain about the same. In addition, I would expect this ratio for any given firm-year to be
comparable to the same ratio for other firm-years within the same industry. This paper examines
anomalies in this ratio to determine if this variable is a reliable predictor of fraud.
For the computer and retail industries in particular, I examine the year-over-year change
in total sales (ch_sales) and the change in receivables as a percentage of the change in total sales,
expecting that as the percent change in total sales increases and as the percent change in
receivables compared to the percent change in total sales increases, the likelihood of fraud also
increases. By comparing these ratios for any particular firm-year to the same ratios for the
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industry as a whole, I can calculate abnormal changes in sales as compared to the industry. I
expect that as abnormal changes in sales increase, so does the likelihood of fraud. Similarly, I
expect that as abnormal changes in receivables to total sales increases, the likelihood of fraud
does as well. These variables were selected for the computer hardware and software industry
because many sales within this industry are business to business transactions, in which the
purchases may be made on account, affecting the trade receivables account.
For the retail industry, several additional new variables based on sales are introduced.
Some data specific to the retail industry can be obtained via COMPUSTAT: sales per square foot
of retail space, sales per retail store, and same store sales (sss; this data item presents the sales
figures only for the same store locations that existed in the prior year). From this data, I calculate
change in sales (ch_sales), change in same store sales (ch_sss), change in net sales per square
foot (ch_net_sales_sqft), and change in net sales per retail store (ch_net_sales_stores). I compare
these variables for each firm-year to the corresponding variables for all firms within the industry,
by year. I expect that large year-over-year and large abnormal changes as compared to the
industry will be indicative of misstatement. These variables were selected specifically for the
retail industry because the underlying data is specific to the retail industry; the retail industry is
the only industry in which data on sales by store, by number of stores, or by retail square foot is
collected and recorded. In addition, the number of stores and the number of retail square feet are
considered nonfinancial measures. If a financial misstatement is made, comparison to a related
nonfinancial measure may result in anomalies that could signal a potential misstatement.
It is important to note that the data for these variables was very limited in COMPUSTAT;
very few retail firm-years, relatively, have this data. As a result, the N for these regressions is
very small, relative to the entire data set. In order to run the required regressions, the missing
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data were imputed statistically. A second item to note regarding the sales data for the retail
industry is that the sales data presented in sales per square foot, sales per store, and same store
sales does not agree to the sales data that is used to calculate other variables in this paper. While
the data used to calculate the variables differs between these retail variables and all other general
variables in which a sales figure is used, the reliability of the data is not impacted. The new retail
variables all use the same sales figure and are therefore comparable.
The service industry is greatly varied with respect to the types of firms included. As a
result, no new variables beyond rect_sales and rect_sales_indservices were added to the model.

5.3 Analysis of Misstating Firm-Years
I compare the misstated firm-years to all firm-years listed in COMPUSTAT between
1971 and 2003 (initial sample), and between 1971 and 2011 (expanded sample). While there
were some AAERs issued for early and recent firm-years, I excluded firm-years with fewer than
ten in any particular year. This means that for the initial sample, firm-years 1971 through 1979
and 2003 were excluded. For the expanded sample, firm-years 1971 through 1979 and 2009
through 2011 were excluded. COMPUSTAT data contained about 213,000 firm-years between
1980 and 2008. I reduced the number of firm-years in the data first by removing the firm-years
with no total assets reported (none reported, as opposed to $0 reported), and then by removing
the firm-years associated with banks and insurance (SIC codes 6000-6999). Any remaining
duplicate firm-years were also removed from the COMPUSTAT data. Finally, outliers were
removed from the data after individual review. The remaining data consist of 145,199 (181,696)
total firm-years, of which 834 (1068) are misstatement firm-years for the initial (expanded)
samples. For the computer hardware and software industry, 19,213 (25,491) firm-years are
included in the data, of which 244 (328) are initial (expanded) misstatement firm-years. For the
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retail industry, 10,725 (12,907) firm years are included in the data, of which 59 (76) are initial
(expanded) misstatement firm years. Finally, for the services industry, 17,981 (22,412) firmyears are included in the data, of which 109 (149) are initial (expanded) misstatement firm years.
In order to determine the variables significant in predicting misstatement by industry, I
used a dummy with a value of 1 indicating a misstatement in any given firm-year, 0 if no
misstatement. To indicate misstated accounts, I used a dummy with a value of 1 to indicate
misstatement in each of the revenue, accounts receivable, and inventory accounts, 0 if no
misstatement in each of the three accounts. The logistic model used in each of the base
regressions (prior to adding in the new variables) is:

Misstating Firm-Year = wc_acc + rsst_acc + ch_rec + ch_inv + soft_assets +
ch_cs + ch_cm + ch_roa + ch_fcf + tax + ch_emp (EMP DIFF) + leasedum +
oplease + issue + cff + leverage + bm + ep

5.4 Prediction Models by Industry
In order to determine the variables significant in predicting misstatement when restricting
by industry, I selected three frequently misstating industries to analyze: computer hardware and
software, retail, and services. Using only the firm-years within each of the three industries
selected, I ran separate logistic regressions for each industry. Tables 3 and 4 show the results by
initial and expanded sample and by industry. The first set of results in each table reports the
results of the Dechow model applied to all industries for each time period and is the same across
each panel. The second set reports the results of the Dechow model applied to observations in the
specific industry. The third model is the Dechow model plus added variables applied to the
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industry. Table 3 reports results for the initial sample period of 1980-2002, and Table 4 reports
the results for the full sample period 1980-2008.
The logistic analysis of the computer hardware and software industry found that for both
the initial and expanded samples, ch_rec, soft_assets, leasedum, oplease, issue, and leverage
were significant in predicting a misstated firm-year (Tables 3 and 4, Panel A). These results
differ from those in the Dechow model run on all industries; while Dechow et al. (2011) found
rsst_acc, ch_inv, ch_cs, ch_roa, and ch_emp significant, these variables are not significant for
the computer hardware and software industry. On the other hand, leasedum and leverage are
significant for the computer hardware and software industry, but were not found to be significant
in the Dechow model run on all industries. None of the new variables analyzed were found to be
significant, indicating that none of the new variables for the computer hardware and software
industry are useful predictors of misstatements. While no new variables were significant for this
industry, it is interesting to note that there are some differences in variables that are useful for
fraud prediction in general, as compared to fraud prediction in this industry alone, especially the
importance of leverage in the prediction of fraud in the computer hardware and sales industry.
Tables 3 and 4 Panel B shows the regression results for the retail industry. I removed
firm-years with SIC codes between 5000 and 5190 from the industry analysis, as those codes are
for various wholesalers, as opposed to retail operations that involve selling directly to customers.
The logistic analysis of the retail industry found that for both the initial and expanded samples,
only soft assets and issue were significant in predicting a misstated firm-year, prior to adding the
new variables to the regression. After adding the new variables to the regression, ch_sss and
ch_rec were found to be significant. These results differ from those in the Dechow model run on
all industries; while Dechow et al. (2011) found rsst_acc, ch_inv, ch_cs, ch_roa, ch_emp, and
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oplease significant, these variables were not significant in a regression specific to the retail
industry. In addition, ch_rec was not a significant predictor of misstatement for retail firms until
new variables were added to the regression. In that case, ch_rec was significant, as was ch_sss, a
new variable. Interestingly, change in receivables was positively associated with misstating
firms, suggesting the existence of misstated revenue. However, the change in same store sales
was negatively associated with misstating firms, possibility indicating financial distress. No
other new variables were found to be significant for the retail industry. However, the explanatory
power of the model with added variables was higher than the Dechow model alone.
The logistic analysis of the service industry (Tables 3 and 4 Panel C) found that for both
the initial and expanded samples, ch_inv, soft assets, ch_cs, leasedum, and issue were the
significant variables in predicting a misstated firm-year. As with the other industries, these
results differ from those in the Dechow model run on all industries. Dechow et al. (2011) found
rsst_acc, ch_rec, ch_roa, and ch_emp to be significant, although those variables are not
significant when restricted to firms in the service industry. Neither of the two new variables were
significant for the service industry. It is interesting to note that the power of the models increases
when restricted to service firms, as opposed to all firms. R-squared increases from 0.042 (0.040)
to 0.051 (0.055) when adding the restriction to service firms only in the initial (expanded)
sample. This may mean that misstated firm-years within the service industry could be predicted
more accurately than firms in other industries.
I ran each model twice: once using the variable ch_emp, found significant in Dechow et
al. (2011), and once using the variable EMP_DIFF, found significant in Brazel et al. (2009).
Running these two variables separately eliminated any collinearity that would have been present
had both variables been run in the models simultaneously. In all industry and account models and
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in both the initial, expanded, and decade-based time periods in this study, neither ch_emp nor
EMP_DIFF were found to be significant predictors of misstating firms, though EMP_DIFF
usually outperformed ch_emp. This finding is unexpected, suggesting that changes in employees
is not a significant predictor of misstatements. Further research will be required to reconcile the
differences between this study and prior literature. It may also be interesting to determine if other
non-financial variables found significant in Brazel et al. (2009) will be found to be useful
predictors of misstatement when included in models such as those employed in this study.
After finding the significant variables for each industry and sample, I ran final
regressions inclusive of only the significant variables. Without exception, the R-squared
decreased from that of the third models in each panel, although for the services industry, the Rsquared remained above that of the original Dechow model. This result is promising; for the
service industry, at least, the significant variables found in this study offer better predictive
ability than the Dechow model.
I note that the variables soft_assets and issue were highly significant across all three
industries. This may indicate that these variables could be the most useful predictors of
misstatement, regardless of industry. Soft_assets is a measure of assets that could be manipulated
through management estimates (accounts receivable and the allowance for doubtful accounts, for
example), as a percentage of total assets. Because of the opportunity to manipulate soft assets, it
is expected that such a variable could be a consistent indicator of misstatement. Issue is a dummy
variable indicating whether or not the firm issued securities during the firm-year. This is
essentially a measure of a firm’s need for capital, which could be raised alternatively through
debt. This measure could indicate the firm’s expansion or the firm’s distress. In either event,
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raising capital through stock issuance is shown to be a reliable indicator of misstatement across
all three industries.
Beasley et al. (1999) and Beasley et al. (2010) compiled misstatement information for the
years 1987 to 1997 and 1998 to 2007, respectively, finding in part that computer hardware and
software, retail, and service industries were among the most frequently cited for fraudulent
financial statement reporting. Dechow et al. (2011) include similar findings as part of that study.
Models to predict misstatements by firms within these specific industries could improve
information for financial statement users, and this study finds evidence indicating that some
industry-specific models outperform a more generalized prediction model. Noting the small
number of misstating firm-years in the samples relative to the number of non-misstating firmyears in the samples, the lack of meaningful change in the R-squared for the models may be due
to lack of power. For example, the sample representing the computer hardware and software
industry includes misstating firm-years that make up just 1.3 percent of the total sample. For the
retail and service industries, the misstating firm-years make up less than one percent of the total
sample. Future research may consider using a matched sample approach to determine the most
meaningful variables for use in misstatement prediction models.
I analyzed variance inflation factors (VIF) to determine whether the results were
impacted by multicollinearity due to the added variables. VIFs exceeding 10, indicating
potentially harmful collinearity, were present only in the retail model, in which rect_sales and
rect_sales_indretail were highly correlated. To address this issue, I ran the retail regressions
including only one of these two variables at one time. The panels for the retail industry model
show the variable coefficients and p-values using rect_sales in the model.
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5.5 Prediction Models by Account
In order to determine the variables significant in predicting misstatement by account, I
used a dummy to indicate a misstatement in any given account, noting that a misstatement firmyear can have misstatements in multiple accounts. I ran separate logistic regressions for each
account following the same base model used for the industry regressions. While additional
accounts were cited by the SEC, I focus only on revenue, inventory, and accounts receivable,
which are the most frequently misstated accounts. Table 5 Panels A through C show the results
of the regressions by misstated account.
The logistic analysis of the revenue account found that across all time periods, ch_rec,
soft_assets, and issue were significant (Table 5 Panel A). Similar to the findings in the industry
analyses, the secondary period for the revenue account failed to show significance for ch_inv,
leasedum, and oplease, even though these three variables were significant for the initial and “all
years” time periods. The R-squared values for the revenue account analysis are higher than the
base model run across all years and all accounts, indicating that a revenue-only analysis may be a
more powerful predictor of misstatement than the generalized model.
The logistic analysis of the accounts receivable account found that across all time
periods, ch_rec and soft_assets were significant (Table 5 Panel B). With the exception of the
secondary time period, ch_inv, leasedum, oplease, and issue were significant. These results are
very similar to the results for the revenue account, including the higher R-squared for all time
periods except for the secondary period, when compared to the analysis across all years and all
misstatement accounts.
Finally, the logistic analysis of the inventory account found that ch_inv and soft_assets
were significant in predicting a misstatement across all time periods (Table 5 Panel C).
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Leasedum and issue were significant in all time periods except for the secondary time period.
Interestingly, ch_rec and oplease were found to be significant in the revenue and accounts
receivable analyses but not in the inventory analysis. Since the inventory models outperform the
generalized model across all years and all accounts, this may indicate that misstatement in the
inventory account can be more accurately predicted than misstatements in the generalized model.
I analyzed variance inflation factors (VIF) to determine if the results were impacted by
multicollinearity due to the added variables. For the account-specific models, there were no VIFs
exceeding 10, indicating the absence of potentially harmful collinearity.

5.6 Longitudinal Study of Predictive Variables
I initially selected three time periods over which to analyze the consistency of the
variables found to be significant predictors of financial statement misstatements. The initial time
period of 1980 through 2002 coincides with the time period used in Dechow et al. (2011). The
secondary period of 2003 through 2008 extends from the end of the initial time period through
the end of the available AAER data. The time period of 1980 through 2008 encompasses both
the initial and secondary time periods to get an overall picture of the significant predictive
variables. Table 6 shows the results of the longitudinal study of predictive variables, for all
industries as well as for and the three industries analyzed, individually.
A logistic regression model inclusive of all industries (Table 6 Panel A) found that
ch_rec, soft_assets, leasedum, and issue were significant across all three time periods, often
maintaining the same level of significance and similar coefficients across the time periods, as
well. The analysis of the secondary time period found that while ch_inv and ch_cm were
significant in the initial and “all years” periods, they were not significant in the secondary period.
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The opposite is true of cff and leverage; these two variables were significant in the secondary
time period but not in the initial or “all years” periods.
For the computer hardware and software industry (Table 6 Panel B), only the variable
“issue” was a significant predictor across all time periods. The secondary time period found
ch_rec, soft_assets, leasedum, oplease, and leverage to be not significant, even though these
variables were significant in the initial and “all years” time periods. The variables cff and
rect_sales_indcomp were significant predictors in the secondary period even though they were
not significant in the other two time periods.
Table 6 Panel C shows that for the retail industry, only soft_assets was significant across
all three time periods. Ch_rec, issue, and ch_sss were significant across the initial and “all years”
periods but were not significant for the secondary period. There were no variables significant in
the secondary period but not in the remaining time periods.
Finally, Table 6 Panel D shows that for the services industry soft_assets and issue were
significant across all three time periods, while ch_inv, ch_cs, and leasedum were significant
across all time periods except for the secondary time period. There were no variables significant
in the secondary period but not in the remaining time periods. The variables soft_assets and issue
were most consistently significant across the time periods and all industries, indicating that these
two variables in particular may be the most reliable predictors of misstatements for any given
industry and any given time period.
The findings of this first longitudinal study showed consistency between the initial and
“all year” periods with regard to the variables that were found to be significant predictors of
misstatement. The differences across time periods lay solely with the secondary time period,
whether the secondary time period showed some variables only significant in that time period or
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significant in every other time period except for the secondary period. Some of the differences in
significant variables across time periods may be a result of the difference in the amount of time
included in the time periods; the initial time period consists of 23 years while the secondary time
period consists of only 6 years. The disparity between the time periods may not allow for enough
data in the secondary time period to be comparable to the initial time period.
To allow for more a more consistent comparison of the variables over time, I conducted
the second portion of the longitudinal study using time periods based on natural decades. Using
the periods 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2008, I am able to more reliably determine the
variables that are consistently significant across time. The third decade analyzed is short by one
year as that is the final year of data available. These time periods presented a statistical challenge
at times, however, with very few misstatement firm-years included an any given decade,
especially when also restricted by industry or account. There were some regressions that would
not run when using a logistic regression, but I found that using a backward stepwise logistic
regression helped to alleviate the problems encountered when using a logistic regression.
Therefore, I used the backward stepwise logistic regression for all models in this second portion
of the longitudinal study.
Table 7 and Table 8 show the longitudinal results of regressions by industry and by
account, with time periods arranged by decade instead of by initial and expanded samples. Table
7 Panel A and Table 8 Panel A show the results of all industries and all accounts, by decade. The
findings show that ch_rec, ch_inv, soft_assets, leasedum, and issue were the most consistent
predictors of misstatements across all three time periods, without regard for industry or misstated
account.
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Table 7 Panel B shows that for the computer hardware and software industry, ch_rec,
soft_assets, and leasedum were the most consistent predictors of misstatement across time. As
this industry engages in a significant amount of business to business sales, it is expected that
trade receivables may make up a large portion of the sales, so it makes sense that abnormal
changes in trade receivables is a consistent predictor of misstatements for this industry. It follows
that the ratio of soft assets to total assets is also a consistent predictor of misstatements for the
computer hardware and software industry, since trade receivables are included as a soft asset.
Other soft assets may include inventory, supplies, prepaids, and goodwill, many of which can be
manipulated and still pass a reasonability test. The existence of an operating lease obligation is
the third and final consistent predictor of misstatements for the computer hardware and software
industry, and like the first two predictors, is also related to assets. An operating lease will not
result in the associated asset being included on the balance sheet like a capital lease would. If a
firm within this industry has an operating lease obligation, the likelihood of misstatement
increases.
For the retail industry (Table 7 Panel C), there were no consistent predictors of
misstatement across time. This may be due in part to the small number of misstating firm-years
within the retail industry, with only 9 in the first period, 31 in the second period, and 36 in the
third period, for a total of just 76 misstating firm years across three decades. Another factor to
consider is the changing “storefront” of the retail industry. With online sales making up an
increasing percentage of total retail sales as compared to sales made in brick-and-mortar stores,
measures such as same store sales, sales per number of stores, and sales per square foot of retail
space will likely become irrelevant within the retail industry. In the future, perhaps measures
such as sales per transaction or sales per website hit may replace the obsolete measures.
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For the services industry (Table 7 Panel D), soft_assets and issue were the most
consistent predictors of misstatements. I note that the change in receivables variable is not a
consistent predictor of misstatement for this industry even though it is consistent across all time
periods in the general model. This makes sense as sales transactions on account are less frequent
in the services industry: often payment is due before or at the time that services are rendered. The
soft assets ratio is a consistent predictor, however. It is likely that assets other than cash,
receivables, and PP&E account for the significance of this variable. Finally, the issuance of
securities during the year is a consistent predictor of misstatement for the services industry. The
issuance of securities may indicate a cash shortage or the need for funding to allow for growth. If
a company is looking to grow, there may be incentive to manipulate or misstate the financial
statements to make the company appear to be in a better position than it actually is.
For the revenue account, Table 8 Panel B shows that ch_rec, ch_inv, soft_assets, and
issue were the most reliable predictors of misstatements. Similar results were found for the
misstatements in the accounts receivable account (Table 8 Panel C), with the exception that the
issue variable was not found to be consistently significant for accounts receivable. It was
expected that the same variables that were significant predictors of the revenue account would
also be significant predictors for the accounts receivable account, as the two accounts are so
closely linked: revenue transactions are frequently completed on account, and in the event that
revenue is intentionally overstated by creating false sales transactions, the accounts receivable
account is usually overstated as well. It follows that change in receivables would be a consistent
predictor of misstatements in both the revenue and accounts receivable account, and as
receivables are a soft asset, the ratio of soft assets to total assets being a consistent predictor of
misstatements makes sense as well.
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Table 8 Panel D addresses predictors of misstatements in inventory. Following the
rationale from the prior paragraph for revenue and accounts receivable, changes in inventory and
soft assets were consistent predictors of misstatement.
Anecdotally, anomalies in inventory often coincide with anomalies in receivables and in
the soft assets ratio. For example, if a false sale of a physical good is recorded, revenue will be
overstated, accounts receivable will likely be overstated, and if inventory is not manipulated as
well, the inventory account will likely be abnormally low or high, compared to the prior year in
which no misstatements were made. In addition, intentional misstatements in the inventory
account often must be hidden by maintaining or increasing the total amount of the misstatement
in each subsequent year. As a result of revenue misstatements touching so many different
accounts, it makes sense to see that abnormal changes in inventory and an abnormal soft assets
ratio are consistent predictors of misstatement for the revenue, accounts receivable, and
inventory accounts.
Compared to the general model of all industries, only the longitudinal model for the
services industry consistently matched or outperformed the general model, as evidenced by the
R-squared values (Table 7 Panel D). In addition, the revenue model and the inventory model
consistently matched or outperformed the general model of all misstated accounts (Table 8 Panel
B and Table 8 Panel D, respectively).
The results of the analyses of time periods by decade coincide with the results of the
analyses of the time periods of “initial” versus “expanded,” corroborating the finding that many
predictive variables are consistent across time periods, regardless of how the time periods are
delineated.
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this study, I used Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER) data
compiled by Dechow et al. (2011) to test variables for their ability to predict misstating firmyears within the computer hardware and software, retail, and service industries. I separated the
firm-years into the initial and expanded samples based on the time period used in Dechow et al.
(2011) and recently available data. Using 181,696 firm-years, I tested variables previously
included in a general model, adding an alternative variable for abnormal changes in the number
of employees.
I then analyzed the firm-years within the computer hardware and software, retail, and
service industries. For each of these industries, I tested the variables from the general model, and
then added new, previously untested variables to the industry models.
Based on these general and industry-specific models, I found that two measures of
abnormal changes in the number of employees were not significant predictors of misstatement,
even though previous research did find them to be significant in general prediction models. I also
found that for the retail industry, the added variable “change in same store sales” was a
significant predictor of misstatement, and this industry-specific model had more explanatory
power than the general model. The industry-specific models for the computer hardware and
software industry and the service industry did not identify additional new significant variables,
and did not have greater explanatory power than the general model.
I also found that some variables that Dechow et al. (2011) found to be significant
predictors of misstatements in a general model were not significant in the industry-specific
models tested. In contrast to this, I also found that some variables that were not previously found
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to be significant predictors in a general model were significant predictors in some industryspecific models.
The greater explanatory power of the retail-specific model may be helpful to auditors in
the planning stage of the audit, during which time the risk of misstatement is assessed and
responses to that risk are determined. For audit clients within the retail industry, this model could
assist the auditor in determining if a client presents a greater risk of misstatement. Similarly,
government investigators could use this industry-specific model as a method of determining
high-risk firm-years and select firm-years for review based in part on this assessment. Of course,
creating industry-specific models with high explanatory power for more industries will be ideal
and may be an avenue for future research.
This study also found that across all industries and across all time periods, soft_assets and
issue are the most reliably significant and likely the most useful predictors of misstatement.
Several other variables are significant across the initial and “all years” time periods. The
secondary time period is much shorter than the initial time period, which may be a factor in the
inconsistency of the significance of these other variables.
Further, I analyzed the variables in the base model to determine which, if any, are
significant in the prediction of misstated accounts, looking specifically at the revenue, accounts
receivable, and inventory accounts. I tested the models across the initial, secondary, and “all
years” time periods to determine if the significant predictor variables changed over time. I found
that in all three models, ch_inv, soft_assets, leasedum, and issue were significant, although the
significance often lacked in the secondary time period. Ch_rec and oplease were significant in
the revenue and accounts receivable models, but were not significant in the inventory model. All
three models outperformed the generalized model, indicating that the account-specific models
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may predict a misstated account with more precision and power than the generalized
misstatement model. I also analyzed the models across decade-based time periods, finding
similar results to those found in the first portion of the longitudinal study.
This study is limited first by the data. In investigating and issuing AAERs, the SEC does
not catch all instances of misstatement. Some misstatements may be small enough to fly under
the radar and not be caught by the SEC, and at the same time, the SEC cannot investigate every
firm that is determined to be of higher risk. This selection bias by the SEC may have a
significant impact on the accuracy of the prediction models, with the potential for many false
positives: firms determined to be high-risk but not found to have misstated financial statements.
This study is also limited by the small number of misstating firm-years, as compared to
the relatively large number of non-misstating firm-years. This disparity may result in low power
for each of the models. Future research may benefit from running similar models to determine
significant predictors of misstatement, using a matched sample approach. This approach may
eliminate the power issue and more precisely determine the indicators of financial statement
misstatements.
Finally, future research may include the further study of the significant predictive
variables over time: are the predictors of misstatements static, or are they fluid and change as
fraud methods and industry trends change? Do the coefficients change over additional time
periods? Using similar statistical analyses to predict the method used to misstate the financial
statements (channel stuffing or bill-and-hold, for example) may also be an interesting area for
future research.
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Table 1
Sample Description
Panel A: Sample selection of Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs)
Number of AAERs
AAER No. 1 - No. 2261 from May 1982 to June 2005
Less: missing AAERs
Total AAERs for initial sample period

2,261
(74)
2,187

AAER No. 2262 - No. 3403 from June 2005 through August 2012
Less: missing AAERs
Total AAERs for added period

1,142
(75)
1,067

Total sample of AAERs

3,254

Panel B: Frequency of AAERs by year
AAER
Number
AAER
release date of AAERs Percentage release date
1982
2
0.1
1998
1983
16
0.5
1999
1984
28
0.9
2000
1985
35
1.1
2001
1986
39
1.2
2002
1987
51
1.6
2003
1988
37
1.1
2004
1989
38
1.2
2005
1990
35
1.1
2006
1991
61
1.9
2007
1992
78
2.4
2008
1993
76
2.3
2009
1994
120
3.7
2010
1995
107
3.3
2011
1996
121
3.7
2012
1997
134
4.1
Total

Number of
AAERs
85
111
142
125
209
237
209
187
171
214
146
172
117
111
43
3254

Percentage
2.6
3.4
4.4
3.8
6.4
7.3
6.4
5.8
5.3
6.6
4.5
5.3
3.6
3.4
1.3
100.0
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Panel C: Frequency of AAERs by firm - initial and expanded samples
Number of
AAERs for
each firm
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
20
15
24
25
46
Total

Initial Sample
Number
Percent
of firms of firms
371
41.4
234
26.1
108
12.1
70
7.8
40
4.5
32
3.6
14
1.6
10
1.1
3
0.3
6
0.7
2
0.2
2
0.2
1
0.1
0
0.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
0
0.0
1
0.1
1
0.1
1
0.1
0
0.0
0
0.0
896
100.0

Expanded Sample
Number
Percent
of firms of firms
561
43.3
310
23.9
155
12.0
102
7.9
62
4.8
30
2.3
20
1.5
21
1.6
7
0.5
9
0.7
4
0.3
1
0.1
5
0.4
3
0.2
1
0.1
1
0.1
1
0.1
1
0.1
1
0.1
0
0.0
0
0.0
1
0.1
1
0.1
1297
100.0
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Table 2
Frequency of Misstating Firms by Calendar Year
Panel A: Distribution of misstated firm years - initial sample
FirmFirmYear
years Percentage
Year
years Percentage
1971
1
0.11
1987
24
2.75
1972
1
0.11
1988
27
3.09
1973
1
0.11
1989
43
4.92
1974
2
0.23
1990
34
3.89
1975
2
0.23
1991
45
5.15
1976
1
0.11
1992
48
5.49
1977
1
0.11
1993
42
4.81
1978
4
0.46
1994
35
4.00
1979
9
1.03
1995
37
4.23
1980
17
1.95
1996
39
4.46
1981
23
2.63
1997
45
5.15
1982
31
3.55
1998
57
6.52
1983
25
2.86
1999
72
8.24
1984
25
2.86
2000
68
7.78
1985
17
1.95
2001
39
4.46
1986
30
3.43
2002
21
2.40
2003
8
0.92
Total
874
100.00
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Panel B: Distribution of misstated firm years - expanded sample
FirmFirmYear
years Percentage
Year
years Percentage
1971
1
0.07
1991
46
3.05
1972
1
0.07
1992
49
3.25
1973
1
0.07
1993
44
2.92
1974
2
0.13
1994
39
2.59
1975
2
0.13
1995
42
2.79
1976
1
0.07
1996
46
3.05
1977
1
0.07
1997
64
4.25
1978
4
0.27
1998
83
5.51
1979
9
0.60
1999
111
7.37
1980
17
1.13
2000
130
8.63
1981
24
1.59
2001
123
8.16
1982
32
2.12
2002
106
7.03
1983
26
1.73
2003
92
6.10
1984
26
1.73
2004
71
4.71
1985
18
1.19
2005
56
3.72
1986
31
2.06
2006
33
2.19
1987
26
1.73
2007
28
1.86
1988
27
1.79
2008
11
0.73
1989
43
2.85
2009
4
0.27
1990
34
2.26
2010
2
0.13
2011
1
0.07
Total
1507
100.00
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Table 3
Regression Results by Industry: 1980 – 2002
Panel A: Computer Hardware and Software
Dechow Model - All Ind.
Variable
Coefficient p-value
Intercept
-7.8641 0.0000 ***
wc_acc
-0.0182 0.3755
rsst_acc
0.0176 0.1873
ch_rec
1.2916 0.0000 ***
ch_inv
1.0549 0.0009 ***
soft_assets
1.7432 0.0000 ***
ch_cs
-0.0008 0.0368 *
ch_cm
-0.0007 0.0004 ***
ch_roa
-0.0027 0.4335
ch_fcf
0.0000 0.8457
tax
-0.1274 0.6460
ch_emp
0.0004 0.8354
EMP DIFF
-0.0034 0.4805
leasedum
0.6373 0.0000 ***
oplease
-0.2640 0.1217
issue
1.2533 0.0000 ***
cff
0.0094 0.7486
leverage
-0.0020 0.8879
bm
-0.0008 0.6178
ep
0.0007 0.4115
rect_sales
rect_sales_indcomp

Dechow Model - CH&S
Coefficient p-value
-7.4841
0.0000 ***
-0.0767
0.4646
0.0548
0.1494
1.3065
0.0024 **
0.8364
0.2077
1.3629
0.0000 ***
0.0000
0.9887
0.0004
0.9203
-0.0121
0.6038
0.0000
0.9904
-0.2485
0.2787
0.0017
0.8435
-0.0043
0.5809
0.7398
0.0108 *
-0.6698
0.0019 **
1.6566
0.0001 ***
-0.1499
0.2625
0.1136
0.0008 ***
-0.0002
0.9406
0.0206
0.1318

Dechow Model PLUS - CH&S
Coefficient p-value
-7.4785 0.0000 ***
-0.0735 0.5034
0.0521 0.1787
1.5880 0.0012 **
0.8963 0.1891
1.3450 0.0000 ***
0.0008 0.8094
0.0004 0.9165
-0.0105 0.6942
0.0000 0.9867
-0.2667 0.2477
0.0015 0.8685
-0.0014 0.9170
0.7456 0.0107 *
-0.6667 0.0020 **
1.6470 0.0001 ***
-0.1342 0.3219
0.1136 0.0008 ***
-0.0002 0.9407
0.0202 0.1447
0.0423 0.9235
-0.0048 0.9710
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ch_sales
ch_sales_indcomp
ch_rect_ch_sales
ch_rect_ch_sales_indcomp
Misstating firm-years
Nonmisstating firm-years

R-Squared

-0.0305
-0.0025
-0.0341
0.0006

0.3832
0.9322
0.2674
0.6401

834
144,365
145,199

244
18,969
19,213

244
18,969
19,213

0.042

0.038

0.039
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Panel B: Retail
Variable
Intercept
wc_acc
rsst_acc
ch_rec
ch_inv
soft_assets
ch_cs
ch_cm
ch_roa
ch_fcf
tax
ch_emp
EMP DIFF
leasedum
oplease
issue
cff
leverage
bm
ep
rect_sales
rect_sales_indretail
ch_sales
ch_sales_indretail
sss

Dechow Model - All Ind.
Coefficient p-value
-7.8641
0.0000 ***
-0.0182
0.3755
0.0176
0.1873
1.2916
0.0000 ***
1.0549
0.0009 ***
1.7432
0.0000 ***
-0.0008
0.0368 *
-0.0007
0.0004 ***
-0.0027
0.4335
0.0000
0.8457
-0.1274
0.6460
0.0004
0.8354
-0.0034
0.4805
0.6373
0.0000 ***
-0.2640
0.1217
1.2533
0.0000 ***
0.0094
0.7486
-0.0020
0.8879
-0.0008
0.6178
0.0007
0.4115

Dechow Model - Retail
Coefficient p-value
-6.6803 0.0000 ***
-0.4847 0.5807
0.3566 0.4412
2.3056 0.0846
0.5348 0.6777
1.3204 0.0369 *
0.0007 0.9132
0.0002 0.9598
-0.6807 0.0917
0.0217 0.1485
-0.3028 0.6934
0.0176 0.0969
-0.0238 0.1120
-0.4471 0.4084
0.4829 0.5446
1.2434 0.0444 *
0.3395 0.3604
-0.0155 0.8907
-0.0141 0.4738
0.0081 0.4878

Dechow Model PLUS - Retail
Coefficient p-value
-6.5899 0.3173
-0.6117 0.4682
0.4230 0.3428
3.4247 0.0339 *
0.2973 0.8172
1.6847 0.0137 *
0.0006 0.9283
0.0010 0.9384
-0.7147 0.0617
0.0228 0.1405
-0.2928 0.7232
0.0162 0.2258
-0.0198 0.2654
-0.5450 0.3211
0.3113 0.6720
1.2595 0.0445 *
0.3631 0.3242
-0.0029 0.9800
-0.0118 0.5465
0.0104 0.2727
-10.3373 0.0577
0.5808 0.0762
-0.0324 0.6916
0.0252 0.4404
-0.0886 0.3670
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sss_indretail
ch_sss
ch_sss_indretail
ch_net_sales_sqft
ch_net_sales_sqft_indretail
net_sales_stores
net_sales_stores_indretail
ch_net_sales_stores
ch_net_sales_stores_indretail
Misstating firm-years
Nonmisstating firm-years

R-Squared

0.0951
-0.2719
-0.0651
1.6252
-0.4148
0.0000
-0.3200
8.6217
0.1595

0.3623
0.0007 ***
0.2260
0.9382
0.2885
0.9325
0.9580
0.4096
0.4421

834
144,365
145,199

59
10,666
10,725

59
10,666
10,725

0.042

0.034

0.057
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Panel C: Services
Variable
Intercept
wc_acc
rsst_acc
ch_rec
ch_inv
soft_assets
ch_cs
ch_cm
ch_roa
ch_fcf
tax
ch_emp
EMP DIFF
leasedum
oplease
issue
cff
leverage
bm
ep
rect_sales
rect_sales_indservices
Misstating firm-years
Nonmisstating firm-years

Dechow Model - All Ind.
Coefficient p-value
-7.8641
0.0000 ***
-0.0182
0.3755
0.0176
0.1873
1.2916
0.0000 ***
1.0549
0.0009 ***
1.7432
0.0000 ***
-0.0008
0.0368 *
-0.0007
0.0004 ***
-0.0027
0.4335
0.0000
0.8457
-0.1274
0.6460
0.0004
0.8354
-0.0034
0.4805
0.6373
0.0000 ***
-0.2640
0.1217
1.2533
0.0000 ***
0.0094
0.7486
-0.0020
0.8879
-0.0008
0.6178
0.0007
0.4115

834
144,365

Dechow Model - Services
Coefficient p-value
-8.0140 0.0000 ***
-0.0104 0.8805
0.0148 0.6738
0.8342 0.1514
2.0068 0.0083 **
1.7099 0.0000 ***
-0.0009 0.0185 *
-0.0003 0.6920
-0.0054 0.8198
0.0000 0.8620
0.5835 0.1671
-0.0004 0.8839
-0.0032 0.7256
0.7988 0.0263 *
0.0444 0.9038
1.2761 0.0028 **
0.0185 0.7554
0.0308 0.2583
-0.0008 0.7761
0.0037 0.5616

109
17,872

Dechow Model PLUS - Services
Coefficient p-value
-7.9681 0.0000 ***
-0.0114 0.8720
0.0158 0.6437
0.8196 0.1600
2.0093 0.0082 **
1.7111 0.0000 ***
-0.0009 0.0181 *
-0.0003 0.6863
-0.0056 0.8095
0.0000 0.8548
0.5836 0.1664
-0.0004 0.8864
-0.0032 0.7264
0.7964 0.0277 *
0.0434 0.9062
1.2706 0.0029 **
0.0182 0.7612
0.0308 0.2583
-0.0008 0.7765
0.0037 0.5617
-0.0864 0.6936
0.0366 0.6569
109
17,872
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R-Squared

145,199

17,981

17,981

0.042

0.051

0.051
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Table 4
Regression Results by Industry: 1980 – 2008
Panel A: Computer Hardware and Software
Dechow Model - All Ind.
Variable
Coefficient p-value
Intercept
-7.8690 0.0000 ***
wc_acc
-0.0090 0.5372
rsst_acc
0.0080 0.3484
ch_rec
1.3071 0.0000 ***
ch_inv
0.8998 0.0023 **
soft_assets
1.6666 0.0000 ***
ch_cs
-0.0007 0.0828
ch_cm
-0.0005 0.0018 **
ch_roa
-0.0009 0.8087
ch_fcf
0.0000 0.8409
tax
-0.0119 0.9691
ch_emp
0.0007 0.7755
EMP DIFF
-0.0037 0.4002
leasedum
0.6594 0.0000 ***
oplease
-0.1790 0.1681
issue
1.3276 0.0000 ***
cff
-0.0416 0.4435
leverage
-0.0202 0.2566
bm
-0.0006 0.5955
ep
0.0006 0.4155
rect_sales
rect_sales_indcomp

Dechow Model - CH&S
Coefficient p-value
-7.1813 0.0000 ***
-0.0120 0.8562
0.0230 0.2755
1.1311 0.0051 **
0.9244 0.1421
1.0998 0.0000 ***
0.0003 0.8828
-0.0001 0.9075
-0.0028 0.9004
0.0000 0.7869
-0.2104 0.4250
0.0018 0.8195
-0.0044 0.5594
0.6618 0.0095 **
-0.3067 0.0299 *
1.6426 0.0000 ***
-0.2757 0.0480 *
0.0919 0.0064 **
-0.0020 0.8187
0.0233 0.0715

Dechow Model PLUS - CH&S
Coefficient p-value
-7.0397
0.0000 ***
-0.0113
0.8689
0.0227
0.2491
1.3365
0.0027 **
1.0573
0.1034
1.0763
0.0001 ***
0.0009
0.7544
-0.0001
0.9188
-0.0015
0.9373
0.0000
0.7896
-0.2362
0.3706
0.0015
0.8440
-0.0009
0.9425
0.6544
0.0107 *
-0.3051
0.0323 *
1.6325
0.0000 ***
-0.2507
0.0755
0.0919
0.0062 **
-0.0020
0.8136
0.0230
0.0765
-0.4349
0.4097
0.1310
0.3171
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ch_sales
ch_sales_indcomp
ch_rect_ch_sales
ch_rect_ch_sales_indcomp
Misstating firm-years
Nonmisstating firm-years

R-Squared

-0.0201
-0.0164
-0.0273
-0.0003

0.5757
0.6623
0.3367
0.6133

1,068
180,628
181,696

328
25,163
25,491

328
25,163
25,491

0.040

0.031

0.032
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Panel B: Retail
Variable
Intercept
wc_acc
rsst_acc
ch_rec
ch_inv
soft_assets
ch_cs
ch_cm
ch_roa
ch_fcf
tax
ch_emp
EMP DIFF
leasedum
oplease
issue
cff
leverage
bm
ep
rect_sales
rect_sales_indretail
ch_sales
ch_sales_indretail
sss

Dechow Model - All Ind.
Coefficient p-value
-7.8690
0.0000 ***
-0.0090
0.5372
0.0080
0.3484
1.3071
0.0000 ***
0.8998
0.0023 **
1.6666
0.0000 ***
-0.0007
0.0828
-0.0005
0.0018 **
-0.0009
0.8087
0.0000
0.8409
-0.0119
0.9691
0.0007
0.7755
-0.0037
0.4002
0.6594
0.0000 ***
-0.1790
0.1681
1.3276
0.0000 ***
-0.0416
0.4435
-0.0202
0.2566
-0.0006
0.5955
0.0006
0.4155

Dechow Model - Retail
Coefficient p-value
-7.1460 0.0000 ***
-0.1575 0.6707
0.1161 0.7509
1.4549 0.2139
-0.2423 0.8200
1.7418 0.0016 **
0.0012 0.8814
0.0003 0.9540
0.0140 0.7203
0.0001 0.8208
0.0529 0.9449
0.0182 0.0918
-0.0261 0.0784
-0.3883 0.4179
0.1986 0.7363
1.5233 0.0120 *
0.0916 0.5571
-0.0093 0.9165
-0.0175 0.2584
0.0081 0.3614

Dechow Model PLUS - Retail
Coefficient p-value
-6.7719 0.0057 **
-0.2372 0.5385
0.1910 0.6148
2.7648 0.0432 *
-0.6180 0.5656
2.1187 0.0003 ***
0.0011 0.8943
0.0022 0.8501
0.0151 0.7164
0.0001 0.8515
0.1645 0.8413
0.0185 0.1578
-0.0241 0.1623
-0.4610 0.3435
0.1516 0.8100
1.4944 0.0137 *
0.1060 0.5326
0.0086 0.9203
-0.0179 0.2456
0.0089 0.3002
-6.9577 0.1195
0.2965 0.2644
-0.0246 0.6332
0.0205 0.3536
0.0067 0.8758
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sss_indretail
ch_sss
ch_sss_indretail
ch_net_sales_sqft
ch_net_sales_sqft_indretail
net_sales_stores
net_sales_stores_indretail
ch_net_sales_stores
ch_net_sales_stores_indretail
Misstating firm-years
Nonmisstating firm-years

R-Squared

0.0121
-0.1136
-0.0021
-2.7117
-0.0123
0.0000
0.2699
3.8992
-0.0011

0.7177
0.0446 *
0.0671
0.7722
0.8731
0.9471
0.8988
0.6324
0.9901

1,068
180,628
181,696

76
12,831
12,907

76
12,831
12,907

0.040

0.029

0.040
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Panel C: Services
Variable
Intercept
wc_acc
rsst_acc
ch_rec
ch_inv
soft_assets
ch_cs
ch_cm
ch_roa
ch_fcf
tax
ch_emp
EMP DIFF
leasedum
oplease
issue
cff
leverage
bm
ep
rect_sales
rect_sales_indservices
Misstating firm-years
Nonmisstating firm-years

Dechow Model - All Ind.
Coefficient p-value
-7.8690
0.0000 ***
-0.0090
0.5372
0.0080
0.3484
1.3071
0.0000 ***
0.8998
0.0023 **
1.6666
0.0000 ***
-0.0007
0.0828
-0.0005
0.0018 **
-0.0009
0.8087
0.0000
0.8409
-0.0119
0.9691
0.0007
0.7755
-0.0037
0.4002
0.6594
0.0000 ***
-0.1790
0.1681
1.3276
0.0000 ***
-0.0416
0.4435
-0.0202
0.2566
-0.0006
0.5955
0.0006
0.4155

1,068
180,628

Dechow Model - Services
Coefficient p-value
-8.2619 0.0000 ***
-0.0072 0.8419
0.0078 0.7671
0.8810 0.0923
1.8147 0.0048 **
1.7519 0.0000 ***
-0.0009 0.0190 *
-0.0002 0.7593
-0.0007 0.9322
0.0000 0.8805
0.4033 0.3245
-0.0001 0.9820
-0.0031 0.6925
1.0239 0.0036 **
-0.0759 0.8339
1.3849 0.0004 ***
-0.0097 0.9102
0.0272 0.3181
-0.0009 0.7205
0.0041 0.4654

149
22,263

Dechow Model PLUS - Services
Coefficient p-value
-8.1747 0.0000 ***
-0.0083 0.8048
0.0090 0.7117
0.8780 0.0972
1.8231 0.0047 **
1.7585 0.0000 ***
-0.0009 0.0182 *
-0.0002 0.7495
-0.0005 0.9464
0.0000 0.8453
0.4117 0.3143
-0.0001 0.9844
-0.0031 0.6928
1.0092 0.0043 **
-0.0737 0.8396
1.3725 0.0005 ***
-0.0116 0.8959
0.0275 0.3133
-0.0009 0.7200
0.0041 0.4660
-0.1693 0.2639
0.0662 0.1845
149
22,263
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R-Squared

181,696

22,412

22,412

0.040

0.054

0.055

67
Table 5
Regression Results by Account: Various Sample Periods
Panel A: Revenue
Variable
Intercept
WC_acc
rsst_acc
ch_rec
ch_inv
soft_assets
ch_cs
ch_cm
ch_roa
ch_fcf
tax
ch_emp
EMP DIFF
leasedum
oplease
issue
cff
leverage
bm
ep

Initial Period
Coefficient p-value
-8.5156
0.0000
-0.0201
0.4559
0.0182
0.3305
1.8262
0.0000
1.2944
0.0007
2.1755
0.0000
-0.0002
0.8933
0.0000
0.9884
-0.0027
0.5833
0.0000
0.8990
-0.0443
0.9169
0.0003
0.8781
-0.0011
0.7534
-0.5022
0.0004
-0.4308
0.0044
1.6002
0.0000
-0.0017
0.9702
0.0048
0.6602
-0.0013
0.5922
0.0008
0.4779

Misstating firm-years
Nonmisstating firm-years

452
144,747
145,199

***

***
***
***

***
**
***

Secondary Period
Coefficient p-value
-8.5415 0.0000
-0.0054 0.8886
0.0079 0.7504
1.8949 0.0009
0.9153 0.3685
2.1266 0.0000
0.0001 0.9633
0.0000 0.9740
-0.0017 0.8906
0.0000 0.9032
0.1714 0.7811
0.0018 0.7429
-0.0047 0.7028
-0.3481 0.3095
-0.0502 0.9019
1.7150 0.0037
-0.3071 0.1676
-0.0617 0.2869
-0.0002 0.9001
0.0004 0.8549
115
36,382
36,497

***

***
***

**

All Years
Coefficient p-value
-8.5192
0.0000
-0.0099
0.5957
0.0078
0.4793
1.7980
0.0000
1.2141
0.0006
2.1631
0.0000
-0.0001
0.9480
0.0000
0.9914
-0.0008
0.8601
0.0000
0.8978
0.0246
0.9510
0.0007
0.8001
-0.0016
0.6653
-0.4848
0.0002
-0.2687
0.0248
1.6112
0.0000
-0.0304
0.6056
0.0002
0.9882
-0.0008
0.6369
0.0007
0.4907

***

***
***
***

***
*
***

567
181,129
181,696
67

68
R-Squared

0.053

0.045

0.050
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Panel B: Accounts Receivable
Variable
Intercept
WC_acc
rsst_acc
ch_rec
ch_inv
soft_assets
ch_cs
ch_cm
ch_roa
ch_fcf
tax
ch_emp
EMP DIFF
leasedum
oplease
issue
cff
leverage
bm
ep
Misstating firm-years
Nonmisstating firm-years

R-Squared

Initial Period
Coefficient p-value
-9.211
0.000
-0.004
0.954
0.006
0.925
1.775
0.000
1.644
0.003
2.838
0.000
0.000
0.873
0.000
0.863
-0.001
0.909
0.000
0.958
-0.036
0.959
0.001
0.899
-0.007
0.418
-1.143
0.000
-0.665
0.001
0.882
0.004
-0.052
0.659
0.009
0.466
-0.001
0.831
0.001
0.747

***

***
**
***

***
**
**

Secondary Period
Coefficient p-value
-9.430
0.000 ***
-0.003
0.969
0.005
0.913
2.169
0.010 *
0.485
0.782
1.762
0.006 **
0.000
0.951
0.000
0.992
-0.002
0.926
0.000
0.961
0.326
0.616
0.002
0.810
-0.003
0.855
-0.478
0.376
-0.157
0.716
1.927
0.058
-0.302
0.377
0.004
0.948
0.000
0.932
0.000
0.903

All Years
Coefficient p-value
-9.1151
0.0000
-0.0030
0.9416
0.0034
0.9050
1.8135
0.0000
1.4556
0.0055
2.5505
0.0000
-0.0002
0.8863
-0.0001
0.9450
-0.0015
0.8747
0.0000
0.9964
0.1301
0.8330
0.0011
0.8377
-0.0061
0.4489
-1.0232
0.0001
-0.3757
0.0023
0.9997
0.0005
-0.0520
0.6586
0.0089
0.4962
-0.0005
0.8241
0.0006
0.7224

170
145,029
145,199

49
36,448
36,497

219
181,477
181,696

0.061

0.036

0.053

***

***
**
***

***
**
***
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Panel C: Inventory
Variable
Intercept
WC_acc
rsst_acc
ch_rec
ch_inv
soft_assets
ch_cs
ch_cm
ch_roa
ch_fcf
tax
ch_emp
EMP DIFF
leasedum
oplease
issue
cff
leverage
bm
Ep
Misstating firm-years
Nonmisstating firm-years

R-Squared

Initial Period
Coefficient p-value
-9.5466
0.0000
-0.0196
0.8345
0.0220
0.7359
0.6142
0.3521
2.7418
0.0000
2.8786
0.0000
-0.0001
0.9553
-0.0005
0.5516
-0.0029
0.7542
0.0000
0.9729
0.0531
0.9588
0.0003
0.9341
-0.0070
0.4914
-0.8413
0.0064
-0.1339
0.8232
0.8706
0.0129
-0.2709
0.3918
0.0073
0.6745
-0.0007
0.8578
0.0007
0.7550

***

***
***

**
*

Secondary Period
Coefficient p-value
-9.0654 0.0000 ***
0.0016 0.9869
-0.0029 0.9672
0.7043 0.6398
2.3589 0.0257 *
3.3098 0.0003 ***
-0.0003 0.9224
0.0001 0.9358
-0.0047 0.7457
0.0000 0.9985
0.3066 0.7929
0.0031 0.7764
-0.0097 0.7137
-0.7533 0.3095
-0.1250 0.8445
15.9879 0.9684
-0.9547 0.0771
0.0065 0.9237
-0.0001 0.9522
0.0005 0.8962

All Years
Coefficient p-value
-9.8284
0.0000
-0.0076
0.8793
0.0078
0.8321
0.6469
0.2860
2.6931
0.0000
2.9801
0.0000
-0.0001
0.9360
-0.0003
0.6443
-0.0030
0.7537
0.0000
0.9199
0.1470
0.8664
0.0009
0.8898
-0.0071
0.4620
-0.7885
0.0055
-0.1299
0.7614
1.0992
0.0016
-0.4921
0.0941
0.0071
0.6810
-0.0006
0.8382
0.0007
0.7403

124
145,075
145,199

31
36,466
36,497

155
181,541
181,696

0.057

0.057

0.059

***

***
***

**
**
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Table 6
Regression Results by Industry: Various Sample Periods
Panel A: All Industries
Variable
Intercept
wc_acc
rsst_acc
ch_rec
ch_inv
soft_assets
ch_cs
ch_cm
ch_roa
ch_fcf
tax
ch_emp
EMP DIFF
leasedum
oplease
issue
cff
leverage
bm
ep

Initial Period
Coefficient p-value
-7.8641 0.0000
-0.0182 0.3755
0.0176 0.1873
1.2916 0.0000
1.0549 0.0009
1.7432 0.0000
-0.0008 0.0368
-0.0007 0.0004
-0.0027 0.4335
0.0000 0.8457
-0.1274 0.6460
0.0004 0.8354
-0.0034 0.4805
0.6373 0.0000
-0.2640 0.1217
1.2533 0.0000
0.0094 0.7486
-0.0020 0.8879
-0.0008 0.6178
0.0007 0.4115

Misstating firm-years
Nonmisstating firm-years
R-Squared

***
***
**
***
***

***
***

Secondary Period
Coefficient
p-value
-7.9391
0.0000
-0.0046
0.8924
0.0060
0.7884
1.6562
0.0011
0.2083
0.8149
1.4322
0.0000
-0.0001
0.9096
-0.0002
0.7845
-0.0019
0.8622
0.0000
0.8750
0.2448
0.5205
0.0014
0.7413
-0.0049
0.6179
0.6801
0.0126
-0.0838
0.7718
1.6989
0.0000
-0.4987
0.0109
-0.1061
0.0230
-0.0002
0.8761
0.0003
0.8275

***
**
***

*
***
*
*

All Years
Coefficient
p-value
-7.8690
0.0000
-0.0090
0.5372
0.0080
0.3484
1.3071
0.0000
0.8998
0.0023
1.6666
0.0000
-0.0007
0.0828
-0.0005
0.0018
-0.0009
0.8087
0.0000
0.8409
-0.0119
0.9691
0.0007
0.7755
-0.0037
0.4002
0.6594
0.0000
-0.1790
0.1681
1.3276
0.0000
-0.0416
0.4435
-0.0202
0.2566
-0.0006
0.5955
0.0006
0.4155

834
144,365
145,199

234
36,263
36,497

1,068
180,628
181,696

0.042

0.041

0.040

***
***
**
***
**

***
***
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Panel B: Computer Hardware and Software
Initial Period
Variable
Coefficient p-value
Intercept
-7.4785 0.0000
wc_acc
-0.0735 0.5034
rsst_acc
0.0521 0.1787
ch_rec
1.5880 0.0012
ch_inv
0.8963 0.1891
soft_assets
1.3450 0.0000
ch_cs
0.0008 0.8094
ch_cm
0.0004 0.9165
ch_roa
-0.0105 0.6942
ch_fcf
0.0000 0.9867
tax
-0.2667 0.2477
ch_emp
0.0015 0.8685
EMP DIFF
-0.0014 0.9170
leasedum
0.7456 0.0107
oplease
-0.6667 0.0020
issue
1.6470 0.0001
cff
-0.1342 0.3219
leverage
0.1136 0.0008
bm
-0.0002 0.9407
ep
0.0202 0.1447
rect_sales
0.0423 0.9235
rect_sales_indcomp
-0.0048 0.9710
ch_sales
-0.0305 0.3832
ch_sales_indcomp
-0.0025 0.9322
ch_rect_ch_sales
-0.0341 0.2674
ch_rect_ch_sales_indcomp
0.0006 0.6401
Misstating firm-years
Nonmisstating firm-years

244
18,969
19,213

***
**
***

*
**
***
***

Secondary Period
Coefficient p-value
-5.4039 0.0000
0.0173 0.9010
0.0597 0.3335
-0.0201 0.9871
2.4508 0.2204
0.5822 0.2545
0.0012 0.9060
-0.0007 0.9307
-0.0129 0.7762
0.0000 0.7507
2.8600 0.0586
-0.0048 0.8461
0.0186 0.8871
0.0612 0.9085
0.8874 0.4370
1.7190 0.0233
-0.9319 0.0155
-0.0388 0.7442
-0.0001 0.9623
0.0927 0.1341
-3.6664 0.0530
0.8782 0.0300
0.0321 0.8434
-0.1296 0.4528
-0.0464 0.7321
-0.0007 0.3469
84
6,194
6,278

***

*
*

*

All Years
Coefficient p-value
-7.0397 0.0000
-0.0113 0.8689
0.0227 0.2491
1.3365 0.0027
1.0573 0.1034
1.0763 0.0001
0.0009 0.7544
-0.0001 0.9188
-0.0015 0.9373
0.0000 0.7896
-0.2362 0.3706
0.0015 0.8440
-0.0009 0.9425
0.6544 0.0107
-0.3051 0.0323
1.6325 0.0000
-0.2507 0.0755
0.0919 0.0062
-0.0020 0.8136
0.0230 0.0765
-0.4349 0.4097
0.1310 0.3171
-0.0201 0.5757
-0.0164 0.6623
-0.0273 0.3367
-0.0003 0.6133
328
25,163
25,491

***
**
***

*
*
***
**
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R-Squared

0.039

0.041

0.032
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Panel C: Retail
Variable
Intercept
wc_acc
rsst_acc
ch_rec
ch_inv
soft_assets
ch_cs
ch_cm
ch_roa
ch_fcf
tax
ch_emp
EMP DIFF
leasedum
oplease
issue
cff
leverage
bm
ep
rect_sales
rect_sales_indretail
ch_sales
ch_sales_indretail
sss
sss_indretail
ch_sss
ch_sss_indretail
ch_net_sales_sqft
ch_net_sales_sqft_indretail

Initial Period
Coefficient p-value
-6.5899 0.3173
-0.6117 0.4682
0.4230 0.3428
3.4247 0.0339
0.2973 0.8172
1.6847 0.0137
0.0006 0.9283
0.0010 0.9384
-0.7147 0.0617
0.0228 0.1405
-0.2928 0.7232
0.0162 0.2258
-0.0198 0.2654
-0.5450 0.3211
0.3113 0.6720
1.2595 0.0445
0.3631 0.3242
-0.0029 0.9800
-0.0118 0.5465
0.0104 0.2727
-10.3373 0.0577
0.5808 0.0762
-0.0324 0.6916
0.0252 0.4404
-0.0886 0.3670
0.0951 0.3623
-0.2719 0.0007
-0.0651 0.2260
1.6252 0.9382
-0.4148 0.2885

*
*

*

***

Secondary Period
Coefficient p-value
-6.8318 0.0007 ***
-0.1767 0.8118
0.1417 0.8449
2.7788 0.5915
-2.4167 0.3142
3.9120 0.0035 **
0.0739 0.8158
0.0401 0.7142
0.0129 0.8398
0.0000 0.9023
3.7818 0.5915
-0.0048 0.8394
0.2128 0.4513
-0.0191 0.9872
-0.1633 0.8593
16.3932 0.9944
0.0551 0.8761
0.0037 0.9687
-0.0572 0.5443
0.2224 0.4239
-12.5698 0.5571
0.0663 0.9490
-0.0003 0.9993
-0.1013 0.5702
0.0518 0.4134
0.0107 0.8048
0.0465 0.6141
-0.0010 0.4032
-2.1285 0.8741
-0.0030 0.9680

All Years
Coefficient p-value
-6.7719 0.0057
-0.2372 0.5385
0.1910 0.6148
2.7648 0.0432
-0.6180 0.5656
2.1187 0.0003
0.0011 0.8943
0.0022 0.8501
0.0151 0.7164
0.0001 0.8515
0.1645 0.8413
0.0185 0.1578
-0.0241 0.1623
-0.4610 0.3435
0.1516 0.8100
1.4944 0.0137
0.1060 0.5326
0.0086 0.9203
-0.0179 0.2456
0.0089 0.3002
-6.9577 0.1195
0.2965 0.2644
-0.0246 0.6332
0.0205 0.3536
0.0067 0.8758
0.0121 0.7177
-0.1136 0.0446
-0.0021 0.0671
-2.7117 0.7722
-0.0123 0.8731

**
*
***

*

*
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net_sales_stores
net_sales_stores_indretail
ch_net_sales_stores
ch_net_sales_stores_indretail
Misstating firm-years
Nonmisstating firm-years
R-Squared

0.0000
-0.3200
8.6217
0.1595

0.9325
0.9580
0.4096
0.4421

0.0000
0.0845
-0.8218
-0.0020

0.8739
0.8757
0.9564
0.9870

0.0000
0.2699
3.8992
-0.0011

0.9471
0.8988
0.6324
0.9901

59
10,666
10,725

17
2,165
2,182

76
12,831
12,907

0.057

0.106

0.040
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Panel D: Services

Initial Period
Variable
Coefficient p-value
Intercept
-7.9681 0.0000
wc_acc
-0.0114 0.8720
rsst_acc
0.0158 0.6437
ch_rec
0.8196 0.1600
ch_inv
2.0093 0.0082
soft_assets
1.7111 0.0000
ch_cs
-0.0009 0.0181
ch_cm
-0.0003 0.6863
ch_roa
-0.0056 0.8095
ch_fcf
0.0000 0.8548
tax
0.5836 0.1664
ch_emp
-0.0004 0.8864
EMP DIFF
-0.0032 0.7264
leasedum
0.7964 0.0277
oplease
0.0434 0.9062
issue
1.2706 0.0029
cff
0.0182 0.7612
leverage
0.0308 0.2583
bm
-0.0008 0.7765
ep
0.0037 0.5617
rect_sales
-0.0864 0.6936
rect_sales_indservices
0.0366 0.6569
Misstating firm-years
Nonmisstating firm-years

109
17,872
17,981

***

**
***
*

*
**

Secondary Period
Coefficient p-value
-7.3652 0.0000 ***
0.0206 0.7700
-0.0167 0.7065
1.8674 0.1641
1.9682 0.1626
1.7161 0.0125 *
-0.0053 0.6159
-0.0001 0.9922
-0.0030 0.8534
0.0000 0.9950
-0.5733 0.8405
0.0005 0.9532
-0.0035 0.7959
xxxx
xxxx
-0.4558 0.5942
2.1036 0.0498 *
-0.7090 0.1399
-0.0086 0.9125
-0.0013 0.8098
0.0111 0.6528
-1.1444 0.3400
0.2865 0.2698
40
4,391
4,431

All Years
Coefficient p-value
-8.1747 0.0000
-0.0083 0.8048
0.0090 0.7117
0.8780 0.0972
1.8231 0.0047
1.7585 0.0000
-0.0009 0.0182
-0.0002 0.7495
-0.0005 0.9464
0.0000 0.8453
0.4117 0.3143
-0.0001 0.9844
-0.0031 0.6928
1.0092 0.0043
-0.0737 0.8396
1.3725 0.0005
-0.0116 0.8959
0.0275 0.3133
-0.0009 0.7200
0.0041 0.4660
-0.1693 0.2639
0.0662 0.1845

***

**
***
*

**
***

149
22,263
22,412

R-Squared
0.051
0.066
0.055
Note: For the variable leasedum, “xxxx” indicates that estimation failed when the model included this variable. To allow the
regression to run, I removed the leasedum variable.
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Table 7
Regression Results by Industry: Decade-Based Time Periods
Panel A: All Industries
1980 - 1989
Variable
Coefficient p-value
Intercept
-7.6769
0.0000
ch_rec
2.0088
0.0001
ch_inv
1.6706
0.0031
soft_assets
1.9193
0.0000
ch_cs
ch_cm
tax
1.8343
0.0381
leasedum
oplease
issue
0.6189
0.0208
cff
Misstating firm-years
Nonmisstating firm-yrs
R-Squared

***
***
**
***
*
*

1990 - 1999
Coefficient p-value
-7.9239 0.0000
1.5411 0.0000
1.2204 0.0095
1.6426 0.0000
-0.0007

2000 - 2008
All Years
Coefficient p-value
Coefficient p-value
***
-7.7409 0.0000 ***
-7.9005 0.0000
***
1.3178 0.0002 ***
1.2635 0.0000
**
0.9624 0.0664
0.8679 0.0030
***
1.4858 0.0000 ***
1.6889 0.0000
-0.0009 0.0651
-0.0007 0.0812
0.0003 ***
-0.0005 0.0018

0.7936

0.0000 ***

1.1826

0.0000 ***

0.5805
-0.2243
1.7981
-0.4089

0.0005 ***
0.0776
0.0000 ***
0.0010 **

***
***
**
***
**

0.6638

0.0000 ***

1.3139

0.0000 ***

148
54,447
54,595

404
68,345
68,749

516
57,836
58,352

1,068
180,628
181,696

0.041

0.044

0.040

0.040
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Panel B: Computer Hardware and Software
1980 - 1989
1990 - 1999
Variable
Coefficient p-value
Coefficient p-value
Intercept
-6.8799 0.0000 ***
-6.2734 0.0000
ch_rec
1.7596 0.0405 *
1.5612 0.0042
ch_inv
2.3002 0.0116
soft_assets
3.5047 0.0016 **
1.0318 0.0120
leasedum
-0.8707 0.0319 *
1.2373 0.0153
oplease
cff
leverage
0.0885 0.0187

2000 - 2008
All Years
Coefficient p-value
Coefficient p-value
***
-5.8441 0.0000 ***
-5.8806 0.0000
**
1.0924 0.0035
*
1.0762 0.0730
*
0.9415 0.0056 **
1.0723 0.0000
*
1.3482 0.0096 **
0.8913 0.0004
-0.2880 0.0779
-0.3162 0.0251
-0.4422 0.0400 *
*
0.0869 0.0059

Misstating firm-years
Nonmisstating firm-yrs

29
5,192
5,221

128
9,763
9,891

171
10,208
10,379

328
25,163
25,491

R-Squared

0.058

0.032

0.019

0.018

***
**
***
***
*
**
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Panel C: Retail

1980 – 1989
Variable
Coefficient p-value
Intercept
-6.7538 0.0000
ch_rec
7.0520 0.0026
soft_assets
tax
-65.6836 0.0000
ch_emp
EMP DIFF
oplease
2.0498 0.0729
issue
bm
-0.2037 0.0035
ch_sales_indretail
ch_sss
ch_sss_indretail

1990 - 1999
2000 - 2008
Coefficient p-value
Coefficient p-value
***
-6.7108 0.0000 ***
-21.203
0.991
**
2.6953 0.0025 **
***
0.0318 0.0254 *
-0.0901 0.0038 **
**

16.744
0.0209

0.993

0.0611

All Years
Coefficient p-value
-7.5584 0.0000 ***
1.7980
0.0205
-0.0288
1.4697
-0.1077
-0.0020

0.0008 ***
0.0509
0.0500
0.0128 *
0.0519
0.0765

Misstating firm-years
Nonmisstating firm-yrs

9
4,177
4,186

31
5,114
5,145

36
3,540
3,576

76
12,831
12,907

R-Squared

0.263

0.043

0.024

0.028
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Panel D: Services
Variable
Intercept
ch_rec
ch_inv
soft_assets
ch_cs
tax
leasedum
issue

1980 – 1989
1990 - 1999
Coefficient p-value
Coefficient p-value
-6.2333 0.0000 ***
-7.8473 0.0000 ***
2.3867 0.0424 *
1.2895 0.0620
2.5703 0.0651
1.7571 0.0030 **
8.8924

0.0002 ***
1.7279

0.0169 *

2000 - 2008
Coefficient p-value
-9.3545 0.0000 ***

All Years
Coefficient p-value
-8.2240 0.0000 ***

2.1147
1.3945

0.0030 **
0.0021 **

1.8143
1.7671
-0.0009

0.0029 **
0.0000 ***
0.0139 *

2.3936
1.9282

0.0177 *
0.0081 **

1.0070
1.4266

0.0038 **
0.0003 ***

Misstating firm-years
Nonmisstating firm-years

17
6,209
6,226

49
8,794
8,843

83
7,260
7,343

149
22,263
22,412

R-Squared

0.063

0.045

0.067

0.052
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Table 8
Regression Results by Account: Decade-Based Time Periods
Panel A: All Accounts
1980 - 1989
Variable
Coefficient p-value
Intercept
-7.6769 0.0000
ch_rec
2.0088 0.0001
ch_inv
1.6706 0.0031
soft_assets
1.9193 0.0000
ch_cs
ch_cm
tax
1.8343 0.0381
leasedum
oplease
issue
0.6189 0.0208
cff
Misstating firm-years
Nonmisstating firm-yrs
R-Squared

1990 - 1999
Coefficient p-value
***
-7.9239 0.0000
***
1.5411 0.0000
**
1.2204 0.0095
***
1.6426 0.0000

***
***
**
***

-0.0007

**

*
*

2000 - 2008
All Years
Coefficient p-value
Coefficient p-value
***
-7.7409 0.0000 ***
-7.9005 0.0000
***
1.3178 0.0002 ***
1.2635 0.0000
**
0.9624 0.0664
0.8679 0.0030
***
1.4858 0.0000 ***
1.6889 0.0000
-0.0009 0.0651
-0.0007 0.0812
0.0003 ***
-0.0005 0.0018

0.7936

0.0000 ***

1.1826

0.0000 ***

0.5805
-0.2243
1.7981
-0.4089

0.0005 ***
0.0776
0.0000 ***
0.0010 **

0.6638

0.0000 ***

1.3139

0.0000 ***

148
54,447
54,595

404
68,345
68,749

516
57,836
58,352

1,068
180,628
181,696

0.041

0.044

0.040

0.040
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Panel B: Revenue
Variable
Intercept
ch_rec
ch_inv
soft_assets
tax
leasedum
oplease
issue
cff

1980 - 1989
Coefficient p-value
-8.3564 0.0000
2.5898 0.0000
1.7560 0.0095
1.9272 0.0001
2.2024 0.0172
-0.3888 0.0872
1.0533

Misstating firm-years
Nonmisstating firm-yrs
R-Squared

1990 - 1999
Coefficient p-value
***
-9.4985 0.0000
***
2.1983 0.0000
**
1.7983 0.0012
***
1.9011 0.0000
*
0.9575 0.0004

0.0088 **

1.7311

2000 - 2008
All Years
Coefficient p-value
Coefficient p-value
***
-8.7613 0.0000 ***
-9.0105 0.0000
***
1.5686 0.0001 ***
1.7604 0.0000
**
1.2023 0.0006
***
2.2681 0.0000 ***
2.1652 0.0000
***

0.0000 ***

0.4017
-0.2608
1.7966
-0.2852

0.0672
0.0463 *
0.0000 ***
0.0606

0.4905
-0.2672
1.6083

***
***
***
***

0.0002 ***
0.0205 *
0.0000 ***

91
54,504
54,595

211
68,538
68,749

265
58,087
58,352

567
181,129
181,696

0.053

0.061

0.047

0.050
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Panel C: Accounts Receivable
1980 - 1989
1990 - 1999
Variable
Coefficient p-value
Coefficient p-value
Intercept
-8.6062 0.0000 ***
-10.9017 0.0000
ch_rec
2.7340 0.0082 **
2.1587 0.0000
ch_inv
3.1654 0.0008 ***
2.2027 0.0029
soft_assets
3.3563 0.0000
leasedum
0.9017 0.0989
1.3493 0.0093
oplease
issue
0.7220 0.0917
Misstating firm-years
Nonmisstating firm-yrs
R-Squared

2000 - 2008
All Years
Coefficient p-value
Coefficient p-value
***
-9.4663 0.0000 ***
-10.1416 0.0000
***
1.3035 0.0238 *
1.7574 0.0000
**
1.4249 0.0060
***
2.1824 0.0000 ***
2.5597 0.0000
**
0.6439 0.0692
1.0259 0.0001
-0.3128 0.0083 **
-0.3619 0.0020
1.4280 0.0053 **
1.0000 0.0005

26
54,569
54,595

81
68,668
68,749

112
58,240
58,352

219
181,477
181,696

0.046

0.081

0.037

0.053

***
***
**
***
***
**
***
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Panel D: Inventory
1980 - 1989
1990 - 1999
Variable
Coefficient p-value
Coefficient p-value
Intercept
-10.6788 0.0000 ***
-10.4771 0.0000
ch_inv
2.6892 0.0010 **
2.4521 0.0134
soft_assets
3.3592 0.0004 **
2.7439 0.0001
leasedum
1.6556 0.0222
issue
1.2119 0.0985
cff
Misstating firm-years
Nonmisstating firm-yrs
R-Squared

2000 - 2008
All Years
Coefficient p-value
Coefficient p-value
***
-9.9863 0.0000 ***
-10.6626 0.0000
*
3.1853 0.0000 ***
2.5406 0.0000
***
3.0271 0.0000 ***
3.0515 0.0000
*
0.8144 0.0040
1.5824 0.0090 **
1.0647 0.0021
-0.7821 0.0080 **

31
54,564
54,595

49
68,700
68,749

75
58,277
58,352

155
181,541
181,696

0.061

0.048

0.064

0.057

***
***
***
**
**

85
Appendix A
Variable Calculations

Variable
Misstatement flag

Abbreviation
misstate

Pred
sign
N/A

Calculation
1 if misstatement firm-year

Accruals quality related variables
WC accruals
wc acc

+

((Δ current assets - Δ cash) - (Δ current
liabilities - Δ debt in current liabilities - Δ
taxes payable)) / average total assets

RSST accruals

+

(Δ WC accruals + Δ ((total assets - current
assets - investments and advances) - (total
liabilities - current liabilities - long term
debt)) + Δ ((short term investments + long
term investments) - (long term debt + debt
in current liabilitites + preferred stock))) /
average total assets
Δ accounts receivable / average total
assets
Δ inventory / average total assets
(total assets - PP&E - cash) / total assets

rsst acc

Change in receivables ch rec

+

Change in inventory
% Soft assets

+
-

ch inv
soft assets

Performance variables
% Change in cash
ch cs
sales

-

% Change in cash
margin

ch cm

-

Change in return on
assets

ch roa

+

Change in free cash
flows
Deferred tax expense

ch fcf

-

tax

+

((sales - Δ accounts receivable)t - (sales Δ accounts receivable)t-n) / (sales - Δ
accounts receivable)t-n
(1 - ((cost of goods sold - Δ inventory + Δ
accounts payable) / ((sales - Δ accounts
receivable))t - (1 - ((cost of goods sold - Δ
inventory + Δ accounts payable) / ((sales Δ accounts receivable)))t-n) / (1 - ((cost of
goods sold - Δ inventory + Δ accounts
payable) / ((sales - Δ accounts
receivable))t-n
(earnings / average total assets)t (earnings / average total assets)t-n
Δ (earnings - RSST accruals) / average
total assets
deferred tax expenset / total assetst-n
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Nonfinancial variables
Abnormal change in
ch_emp
employees
Abnormal change in
employees

EMP DIFF

Off-balance-sheet variables
Existence of
leasedum
operating leases
Change in operating
oplease
leases

-

(((# employees)t - (# employees)t-n) / (#
employees)t-n) - (((total assets)t - (total
assets)t-n) / (total assets)t-n)
(((revenue)t - (revenues)t-n) / (revenue)t-n) (((# employees)t - (# employees)t-n) / (#
employees)t-n)

+

1 if future operating lease obligations > 0

+

(Δ Σ(present value of future operating
lease obligations)) / average total assets

Market-related variables
Issuance of securities issue
New financing raised cff

+
+

Leverage
Book to market
Earnings to price

+
-

1 if securities issued during the year
amount of financing raised / average total
assets
long-term debt / total assets
equity / market value
earnings / market value

+

total receivables / sales

+

(rect sales (firm-year) - rect sales
(industry-year)) / rect sales (industryyear)

leverage
bm
ep

New variables – all industries
Receivables to total
rect sales
sales
Receivables to total
rect sales ind
sales, compared to
industry

Computer hardware and software variables
% Change in total
ch sales
+
sales
% Change in total
ch sales ind
+
sales, compared to
industry

(salest - salest-1) / salest-1
(ch sales (firm-year) - ch sales (industryyear)) / ch sales (industry-year)

% Change in
receivables to %
change in sales

ch rect ch
sales

+

((total receivablest - total receivablest-1) /
total receivablest-1) - ((salest - salest-1) /
salest-1)

% Change in
receivables to %
change in sales,
compared to industry

ch rect ch
sales ind

+

(ch rec ch sales (firm-year) - ch rec ch
sales (industry-year)) / ch rec ch sales
(industry-year)
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Retail variables
% Change in total
sales
% Change in total
sales, compared to
industry

ch sales

+

(salest - salest-1) / salest-1

ch sales ind

+

ch sales (firm-year) - ch sales (industryyear)

Same store sales
Same store sales,
compared to industry
% Change in same
store sales
% Change in same
store sales, compared
to industry

sss
sss ind

+
+

Data obtained via COMPUSTAT
sss (firm-year) - sss (industry-year)

ch sss

+

(ssst - ssst-1) / ssst-1

ch sss ind

+

ch sss (firm-year) - ch sss (industry-year)

% Change in sales to
square feet retail
space

ch net sales
sqft

+

((net sales / sqft)t - (net sales / sqft)t-1) /
(net sales / sqft)t-1 [net sales / sqft provided
by COMPUSTAT]

% Change in sales to
square feet retail
space, compared to
industry

ch net sales
sqft ind

+

ch net sales sqft (firm-year) - ch net sales
sqft (industry-year)

% Change in sales to
number of retail
stores

ch net sales
stores

+

((net sales / average retail stores)t - (net
sales / average retail stores)t-1) / (net sales /
average retail stores)t-1

% Change in sales to
number of retail
stores, compared to
industry

ch sales
stores ind

+

ch net sales stores (firm-year) - ch net
sales stores (industry-year)
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